THE ADMINISTRATION: Going to Bat for Beleaguered Bert

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The deadline on the sale of Lance's stock has been weighing more and more heavily on him. As news coverage of Lance's troubles increased, the President showed signs of growing concern. He asked Atlanta Attorney Charles Kirbo. 60, his longtime confidant, to fly to Washington, for example, and Carter does not call on Kirbo for advice on routine matters.

Finally, the President sent a letter to Senator Abraham Ribicoff: chairman of the Senate committee that confirmed the budget director, recommending an unlimited extension of the Dec. 31 deadline. The deadline. Carter noted, helped to foster "a substantial artificial lowering of the stock price." Ribicoff agreed to have his committee consider the idea.

Other promises besides the pledge to sell his bank stock are complicating Lance's life. The chunky OMB chief made these commitments during his confirmation hearings, and since then seems to have violated a number of them:

¶ Lance promised the Senate committee that, with minor reservations, he would "sever all connections with my present employers, business firms, business associations and business organizations"—presumably including the Georgia bank. Yet on March 29, Lance met in his OMB office with John Stembler, board chairman of the National Bank of Georgia, and Robert Guyton, then being wooed—successfully—to be the N.B.G.'s new president. Lance's explanation is that he "very specifically" had the right to talk about the N.B.G. "with regard to stock and management" until the Dec. 31 divestiture date. A Lance spokesman said that the permission to be involved in selection of a new president came via an "oral understanding" with Senate Committee Chairman Ribicoff. Yet Ribicoff told TIME: "I never recall any such conversation. Nothing was ever discussed about management."

¶ Lance also promised that while he held substantial holdings in the N.B.G.. as OMB director he would "disqualify myself from participation in any matters directly involving bank regulation." But on June 28, Lance wrote to Senate Banking Committee Chairman William Proxmire opposing a proposal that would require banks and savings and loan institutions to give special priority to local community credit needs. Proxmire calls the letter "a direct violation of [Lance's] written commitment to the Senate." A spokesman for Lance argued that the letter had been drafted by OMB staff; Lance merely signed it.

¶ In May, shortly after the nation's biggest banks raised their prime lending rates. Lance became the Carter Administration's leading critic of the policy. Yet many of Lance's bank loans had interest rates tied directly to the prime rate. When it rose, so did his interest charges. On the other hand, as a major holder of banking stock at the N.B.G., Lance stood to gain—as bank profitability gained—from hikes in the prime.

Though his interests might well cancel each other out, Lance put himself in a questionable spotlight when he spoke out on interest rates.