The Presidency by Hugh Sidey: Learning to Change His Mind

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Months ago, in the first meeting on tax increases, Ronald Reagan sat at the Cabinet table and indifferently thumbed the folder that had been placed before him. He had the air of a man unconvinced, unenthusiastic and disengaged.

He read the notes in front of him as if they were an unfamiliar script One of the participants in that meeting concluded as he watched the President that Reagan really carried a fundamental distrust of the figures being show ered on him, showing huge deficits to come and continuing high interest rates. "What's wrong with Wall Street?" Reagan grumped more than once. He felt that

there was no reason for interest rates to stay so high. Not that long ago, his huge tax and budget cuts had been

approved, and now he was waiting for the world to turn his way, as it does in the movies. But it was not happening. The men who counseled Reagan in that first session and later were more realistic. The economy was headed toward disaster unless deficits were trimmed. Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan watched the President's mood closely. So did Robert Dole, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, White House Chief of Staff James Baker, Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker and David Stockman, Director

of the Office of Management and Budget, all saw the gathering storm and waited for the President to confront reality. It happened slowly. In the next few meetings, as they talked about "tax reform" and closing loopholes as well as raising new money, Reagan seemed to be walking on eggs. He kept looking for other ways to shrink the deficits. There were none that he would accept, such as delaying the tax cuts voted last year. The figures grew worse, and the secret polls brought around by Richard Wirthlin showed the public souring on Reagan's presidency. Something began to change inside Reagan. He was struggling

to be President of all Americans, not just his hard-core conservative supporters. He was out in the center of history's surging stream, where events—not dogma—dictate action for survival. For almost the first time, he seemed ready to move beyond old ideas, old cronies. About the middle of July, Reagan began to consider adopting the tax foundling that had been midwifed by Dole's committee. As August approached, the President's commitment to the plan

began to grow. Indeed, the program of "tax reform" became Reagan's program. Then the President put all the political influence of the White House behind the effort. "If we are going to do it," Reagan told his people, "let's do it right" This ability to act boldly at critical moments is what has gained Reagan such dramatic political victories in Washington. Passage of the tax measure is not going to dispel the crisis. By November there must be moves to cut the budget more, plug other tax

loopholes, cut back defense spending and further restrain entitlement programs, especially Social Security. That challenge dwarfs this one. But if Reagan has grown bigger than supply-side economics, if he has grasped the meaning of

presidential leadership and felt the exhilaration of achieving rather than preaching, he is more likely to succeed in the challenges ahead. There is another hope held