Taking Aim at the MX Missile

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In the long run, however, the strongest threat to the MX is likely to be caused not by the Governors of Utah and Nevada but, oddly enough, by the shelving and probable demise of the SALT II treaty in the wake of Afghanistan. The whole rationale for the MX depends on its ability to survive a surprise onslaught; if the Soviets were not sure that they could destroy the entire system, according to this line of thinking, they would be deterred from attacking in the first place. Under the provisions of SALT II, the Soviets would be allowed to deploy missiles carrying a total of 8,000 warheads, a formidable arsenal but not large enough to guarantee the success of a surprise attack. The Kremlin could not be sure of knocking out all of the 4,600 MX shelters, plus the 1,054 sites for the Minuteman and Titan ICBMs already in place, and still having enough left over to attack American cities. Unlimited by any treaty, the Soviets theoretically could build enough warheads to do all that and more. Says James Foster, senior researcher at the Rand Corp., a private think tank that deals with military affairs: "I'm not sure the MX makes any sense with SALT, but it surely makes no sense without it."

In rebuttal, the Air Force claims that the MX is necessary, SALT or no SALT, if only to make it more difficult for the Soviets to mount a successful surprise attack. For one thing, without an MX system, the Soviets could easily knock out the Minuteman and Titan missiles, leaving the U.S. with no land-based ICBM and dependent for its deterrent on bombers and ICBM-carrying submarines. Without having to worry about land-based U.S. missiles, the Soviets would be in a much stronger position to neutralize the remaining American systems.

If SALT II were abandoned and the Soviets started building up a force big enough to wipe out MX, the Pentagon would simply urge the Government to create more of the dummy shelters. Although some critics of the MX are skeptical, the Air Force argues that it would be cheaper for the U.S. to build shelters than it would be for the Soviets to build warheads. If the Soviets persisted, the U.S. could take the extreme step of building an antiballistic missile system (ABM) to defend the MX and still, by Air Force calculations, end up spending less than Moscow. But that would mean the U.S. would have to abrogate or refuse to renew the 1972 AMB treaty, which expires in 1982.*

Despite growing concern about the MX, Carter and the Pentagon are confident they can get it financed again in Congress in an election year, especially in light of Afghanistan. Brigadier General Guy Hecker, project boss of the MX for the Air Force, notes that there are no easy ways of countering Soviet power. Says he: "All of the solutions are ugly. None of them is pretty. But of all the uglies, the MX is the most attractive."