Nation: Inside the Jerry Ford Drama

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Now began an eleven-hour-long sequence of shuttle meetings between the Reagan and Ford staffs on the Plaza's upper floors. The Ford team consisted of Greenspan, Kissinger, Barrett and Marsh, all of whom had worked in the White House. The Reagan team consisted of Casey, Meese and Pollster Richard Wirthlin, none of whom had White House experience. Only Casey had headed anything as large as a federal agency (the Securities and Exchange Commission). Tackling an immense problem too late, and faced with an artificial convention deadline only a few hours away, the two groups worked at cross purposes.

Their first meeting was a general discussion of the various staff functions at the White House. Ford's people found the Reaganites unsure of how those functions work. Greenspan did most of the talking for the Ford group. There was no friction. Both sides tried to find a solution that would entice Ford. Concluded Casey: "We've got to get something together [on paper] to show you guys."

Wednesday Afternoon: The Paper

At 2:30 p.m. the Reaganites presented the only document drawn up during the meetings. It was described as merely a "talking paper." It bore no relation to anything so grand as an "agreement," "codicil" or a "treaty of Detroit" outlining a "co-presidency"—terms later bandied wildly about the convention hall. A mere 1½ pages of double-spaced typing, it tried to sketch out how Ford would fit into the decisionmaking and paper flow of the White House. One specific point was that Ford would have daily supervisory authority, but not final power of decision, over the National Security Council, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Council of Economic Advisers. Reagan's team turned the paper over to the Ford group with the low-key comment: "Here's some ideas."

The Ford team found the sketch, as one put it, "not unreasonable." It would, in effect, give Ford control over all paper—and thus advice—that would reach the President. The plan also suggested merging somehow the staffs of the two top leaders in the hope of avoiding clashes. But it was all too vague for Ford's men. They had questions. Just who would be in charge of this amorphous staff? From just which agencies and departments would the paper flow to the Vice President?

When Ford's men brought him the document, he was interested, but he still doubted its feasibility. "Maybe there's a way," he said about a new vice-presidential role, "but I don't think there is." It was now nearing 5 p.m., and, as Ford received yet another personal plea from the Governors and from members of Congress, he began to grow testy—which is not his nature. Yet he had now gone 34 hours with only four hours of sleep, and weariness was taking its toll.

Wednesday, Late Afternoon: A Hitch

Ford telephoned Reagan, asked for a chance to see him. Reagan invited him to come right down. The meeting was brief: a mere 15 minutes. But the tone had turned touchy. Ford seemed a shade too assertive to suit Reagan. "Ron, I'm making a sacrifice here," he said, referring to the possibility of running. "And now I'm asking you to make a sacrifice. I want you to appoint Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State."