Hijacking: A Victory for Terrorism

Blackmail, suspicious moves and abject surrender arouse anger and protest

Terrorism lives or dies on whether it achieves success. —Israeli Scholar Benzion Netanyahu

As the three young men clambered down the exit ramp at Damascus airport, holding their pistols high, their V-for-victory signs said it all. It was no empty bravado. They had just pulled off one of the most successful acts of terrorism in recent memory. They had commandeered a Pakistan International Airlines jet with impunity. They had held more than 100 people hostage for 13 days. In an escalating series of ultimatums, they had killed one passenger and threatened to blow up the others. Finally they had hit the jackpot: they won the release of 54 prisoners from Pakistan's President Mo hammed Zia ul-Haq — and apparent freedom for themselves. The Pakistani prisoners, many of them accused murderers and all of them opponents of Zia's military regime, were duly flown to Damascus. As for the hijackers, their surrender to Syrian authorities appeared to be a mere formality on the road to convenient "disappearance."

Thus in an era when political skyjackings had seemed to be declining, a trio of determined gunmen brought that brand of political blackmail back to the forefront of world attention — and proved that it could work. The incident continued to have ominous repercussions long after the last hostage had returned to the welcoming embrace of his family. It heightened international tensions, sparked a hot row between Washington and Moscow, and raised widespread fears of a possible new wave of hijackings. Warned Alitalia Security Chief Aristide Manopulo: "This could lead to a full-scale return to international air terrorism. The Pakistan hijack was completely successful and could open the way to others." (See box.)

Who was to blame for this spectacular triumph of terrorism? The list of suspects was long and tangled. First there were the security guards at Pakistan's Karachi International Airport, who inexplicably allowed three men to board a commercial jetliner with pistols and hand grenades. Then there were the Soviet and Afghan authorities at Kabul airport, where the hijacked plane stayed for six days. Despite repeated entreaties from Islamabad and Washington, they had shown little willingness to work toward ending the standoff. There were the Syrian officials in Damascus, who refused to let Zia send a Pakistani antiterrorist unit and also declined to launch a Syrian commando raid against the hijackers. There was Zia himself, who apparently had no military option left and therefore chose to give in to the demands to avoid a "bloodbath." Finally, there was the Libyan government, which initially offered asylum to the 54 Pakistani inmates—then reneged while its disinvited guests were literally in midair.