Khomeini: A Quest for Vengeance

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But the petroleum industries of both countries, and particularly Iraq, are quite vulnerable. After its attack on Iran's Kharg Island faculties last week, Iraq reportedly warned Japan that its tankers should stop using the island. If Iran decides to retaliate in kind, it would probably aim first at the Iraq-Turkey pipeline, the only export route now available for Iraqi oil, and at the scattered fields to the west of Basra. A determined Iran could take Iraq out of the oil business for as long as two years. But even if warfare should paralyze the oil industries of Iran, Iraq and neighboring Kuwait, thereby removing about 4 million bbl. per day from world oil markets, the loss could be overcome by Saudi Arabia, which could increase production from its current 6.5 million to 10.5 million bbl. per day.

What seems indisputable, as the two Middle East wars continue, is that they are costing the U.S. dearly in prestige Arab rulers who privately would welcome American assistance at the moment fear that they would only inflict damage on their regimes by appearing to be in league with the U.S. The Reagan Administration last week offered to hold joint milltary exercises with Saudi Arabia and any other gulf states that might feel threatened by the Iran-Iraq conflict, but so far there have been no takers. The most critical problem afflicting U.S.-Arab relation at the moment stems from the link that many Arabs believe exists between the U.S. and Israel's operation in Lebanon.

But the Arabs also deeply resent the fact that the Israelis chose to give military support to Khomeini's Iran. The Israelis respond that the aid effort was based on their traditional enmity toward Iraq. They claim their aid was halted several months ago, long before the Iranian invasion of Iraq began. Other sources say that some Israeli aid, including the training of Iranian military personnel in the use of American arms, is continuing.

What the Reagan Administration still needs most, after 18 months in office, is a strong policy for the Middle East.

Another central problem has been its un willingness to say in public what it has been telling the Israelis in private. According to most observers, the U.S. op posed the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, though this did not have any effect on the Israeli government. But by failing to state its position forcefully, the Administration appeared to the Arab states to be a silent partner in the attack or at the very least an overly indulgent ally. Until the U.S. can distinguish openly between American policy and Israeli policy, and rein in some of the more expansionist tendencies of the Begin government, it cannot make real headway in improving its relations with the Arab world.

Theoretically, the Administration was correct to hew a neutral line between Iran and Iraq, but changing circumstances call for a defter touch than the U.S. has displayed thus far. Says Richard Helms, a former U.S. Ambassador to Iran (and onetime head of the Central Intelligence Agency): "Now is the time to come to the aid of our moderate Arab friends.

We shouldn't tilt toward Iraq so much that we throw Iran into the arms of the Soviets, but we can tilt a little bit, enough to encourage the Saudis and some of the others to conclude that we are still their friends and would come to their rescue if worst comes to worst."