A Call for Hardheaded Detente

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Nixon urges Reagan to meet Andropov at the summit

Richard Nixon has observed what he calls the "dangerous deterioration" of U.S.-Soviet relations from the melancholy vantage point of someone who believes he could have prevented it if it had not been for "Watergate and all that." Under the banner of détente, he was the last President to conduct a coherent and largely successful policy for managing the rivalry between the superpowers. During his six years in office, Soviet mischief making in the Third World was more restrained than it has been since. The Soviet leaders opened the door a crack in permitting emigration, only virtually to close it later. They signed agreements that imposed rudimentary but still useful rules on the arms race.

While détente may have been oversold in its heyday, in hindsight it looks undervalued, especially when compared with the naiveté and vacillations of Jimmy Carter or with the worldwide anti-Soviet "crusade" proclaimed by Ronald Reagan last summer. In an interview with TIME in New York City last week, Nixon made clear that he thinks it is time for the Reagan Administration to change both the tone and substance of its dealings with Moscow.

"I wish I could think of another name for it," he says, "but let's just call it hardheaded détente. It's critical for our national security. You can't hold an alliance, or a country, together just with fear. Fear alone won't allow a free nation to sustain the support necessary for high defense budgets and an intelligent foreign policy that avoids the ingredient pitfalls of isolationism and protectionism.

Our leaders have got to provide what is the missing ingredient at the moment, and that is hope. There's got to be some hope that relations can get better and that equitable deals can be made. We've got to get over our disillusionment with détente and put aside the idea that the Soviets will always get two of everything for our one and the notion that the Soviet Union is an outlaw nation and must be so treated."

Nixon is quick to add that he has no use for "false hopes" and "sentimentality" toward the U.S.S.R. "You can't apply the golden rule of the Bible to the Soviets," he says. "The golden rule of Soviet-American relations should be 'Do unto others as they do unto you.' They can't go around the world seeking advantages against us and not expect us to respond. They can't acquire a monopoly in the most threatening sort of missiles, first-strike weapons, without expecting us to build the MX."

"But we've also got to make them understand that we're not out to get them. I know there's a school of thought that if we can fence them in with sanctions, their whole rotten system will come tumbling down. There's a school of thought that hard-line policies on our part will induce change for the better on their part. I wish that were the case, but it's just not going to happen. The Soviets have proved over the years that they can always squeeze their people enough to keep up their military strength."