A New Math for Nuclear Weapons

The question: how to counter Andropov's not-so-zero offer

Can there be a set of numbers between zero and zero-zero? It sounds like the most abstruse speculation in mathematics. But the math in this case is the potentially lethal calculus of nuclear weaponry, and so the question is leading to a backstage brawl in Washington.

At issue is what stand the U.S. should take when negotiations on limiting nuclear weapons in Europe resume in Geneva Jan. 27. Moscow's negotiators presumably will then formally present an offer already proclaimed publicly by Soviet Leader Yuri Andropov: if the U.S. cancels plans to deploy 572 single-warhead Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe beginning in late 1983, the Kremlin will slash its own force of missiles targeted on Western Europe to make it equal to the number of launchers in the British and French forces. That would imply a reduction of 352 Soviet missiles. But only 72 of the 234 modern SS-20s trained on Europe would be included, and these could merely be moved into the Asian part of the U.S.S.R. and quickly brought back and retargeted on Western Europe in a crisis. The remaining 280 cuts would be single-warhead missiles that are obsolete and headed for the scrap heap anyway.

Andropov's plan has already been rejected by the U.S. and its allies as a deceptive response to Ronald Reagan's original proposal to eliminate all U.S. and Soviet missiles in the European theater. Initially known as the "zero option," this proposal has been rechristened in Washington the "zero-zero" plan. Said Reagan last week, with intense sarcasm: "The Soviets have met us halfway .. . they have proposed zero on our part."

Americans and West Europeans point out that the British and French forces are under independent national commands. In the event of a military showdown in Europe, these two nations might act in concert with Washington. But they could also rule out the use of nuclear force, in the hope of staying out of any conflict.

There is a sharp division of opinion in Washington as to how the U.S. negotiators in Geneva should be instructed to reply. The Pentagon counsels simply saying no and insisting on Reagan's zero-zero plan. Defense officials dismiss Andropov's bid as a mere propaganda ploy. They fear that if the U.S. makes a counterproposal, Moscow will ask European governments to delay installation of the American missiles while negotiations continue, then stall the talks endlessly, in effect blocking deployment of the Pershing IIs and cruises without yielding anything.

State Department officials are worried that the same thing might happen if the U.S. takes an unbending stance. In their view, the pressure of the European antinuclear movement will force governments that now want U.S. missiles to reject them unless Washington can show that it is making an all-out effort to achieve agreement with the Soviets.