A Tougher Stand for START

At the other Geneva arms talks, the U.S. digs in

While negotiators smiled and photographers clicked at the reopening of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) talks last week in Geneva, participants in the city's other continuing arms-control drama, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, were themselves preparing to return to the negotiating table this week after a two-month recess. START, which deals with long-range nuclear weaponry, is already unique in the history of arms control between the superpowers. Normally, each side makes a tough, deliberately one-sided opening proposal that gradually becomes more equitable and flexible as the give-and-take proceeds. The opposite has happened with START, at least on the American side. In the course of the negotiations, the Reagan Administration's position has hardened. The chief U.S. negotiator, Ambassador Edward Rowny, 65, must now press for a list of Soviet concessions that has grown longer and more stringent than the measures he originally presented last summer.

That opening proposal, initially sketched by President Reagan in a speech last May at Eureka College, his Illinois alma mater, reflected two strongly held Administration convictions: first, that the Soviet Union had moved dangerously ahead in the nuclear arms race; second, that any START agreement must consequently cut existing Soviet forces, particularly land-based, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), while leaving the U.S. free to catch up by adding to its own arsenal.

More specifically, the U.S. opening proposal was directed at ICBMS. It was thus unabashedly designed to squeeze the mostly land-based Soviet arsenal not just into something smaller, but into a different shape. At the same time, the proposal was neatly tailored to favor a revamped American deterrent featuring the MX missile on land and the Trident II at sea, both of which are still under development. The U.S., which has put much of its missile force aboard aircraft and submarines, is already below the proposal's limit of 2,500 land-based warheads for each side. The Soviets are well above that ceiling.

Since last summer, Rowny's instructions have been amended in a way that is likely to make his job much tougher. In addition to trying to cut Soviet warheads by more than half from the level allowed by SALT in, the U.S. is now insisting that the Soviets reduce by two-thirds the number of launchers for their two most modern and powerful ICBMS, the SS-19, which can carry six warheads each, and the SS-18, which can carry ten.