Archive: Reagan for the Defense

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The question of using spy-plane photographs to bolster Reagan's charges of Soviet involvement in Latin America was debated within the intelligence community. Reagan felt that if the public could see what he sees, it would be more willing to rally around his policies. So, less than two weeks after he signed an Executive Order clamping down on leaks of classified material, he ordered three reconnaissance-plane photographs declassified. He did, however, accede to intelligence agency arguments that the release of additional satellite photographs would reveal too much about U.S. techniques.

Reagan's display of the photographs was not done in a sensational manner, and the evidence revealed in two cases was hardly more than what tourists could have gathered on the ground. Comandante Tomás Borge, a leader in Nicaragua's Sandinista directorate, scoffed at the idea that the Mi-8 Soviet helicopters Reagan pointed out on an airfield at Managua were threats to American security. They are familiar sights at Managua's airport. One was used to transport Pope John Paul II during his visit there in March. Borge told TIME: "You can see them without climbing into a satellite."

The photographs did, however, illustrate an important point that Reagan made: the Soviets are "spreading their military influence" to America's backyard, and doing so in a way that indicates that their aims are far from merely defensive. Pointing to a new 10,000-foot runway on the tiny Soviet-aligned Caribbean island of Grenada (pop. 110,000), Reagan noted: "Grenada doesn't even have an air force. Who is it intended for? The Caribbean is a very important passageway for our international commerce and military lines of communications. The rapid buildup of Grenada's military potential is unrelated to any conceivable threat to this island country." Two photographs of Cuba reveal a communications facility staffed by 1,500 Soviet technicians, which the President said is the largest of its kind in the world, and an airfield from which two modern Soviet antisubmarine planes are operating. "During the past two years, the level of Soviet arms exports to Cuba can only be compared to the levels reached during the Cuban missile crisis 20 years ago," Reagan said.*

Reagan's figures are technically accurate, and the Soviet buildup has indeed been formidable, but there is still ample room for dispute over what the numbers mean. Daniel Inouye, in the official Democratic response, argued that it is wrong to think that the Soviets enjoy a strategic superiority, as Reagan asserted. Said the Hawaii Senator: "Reagan left the impression that the U.S. is at the mercy of the Soviet Union. Most respectfully, Mr. President, you know that is not true. You have failed to present an honest picture." Inouye said that Reagan failed to point out that the Soviet Union's advantage in land-based missiles is "more than offset" by American warheads on submarines and bombers; the total nuclear warhead arsenal of the U.S. is 9,268, compared with 7,339 for the Soviets. (These numbers, from a Democratic Party study, differ somewhat from the most recent Pentagon reports, which say the U.S. has about 9,000 warheads and the U.S.S.R. has about 8,500.)