Storm over the Alliance

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what he expected from the allies. To a potential audience of scores of millions, he stressed that the U.S. needs "the full and aggressive support of our allies" in order to show the Iranians "that we all do stand together in this condemnation of terrorism."

Carter said he had sent a message to the leaders of Europe setting what he called "a specific date" by which the U.S. "would expect this common effort to be successful." It turned out later that he was really talking about mid-May. Carter also implied that the U.S. would resort to military action if need be.

The alliance that now confronts the challenges of Iran and Afghanistan is one of the most remarkable in history. Created more than three decades ago, it has survived longer than just about any other grouping of sovereign states. The U.S. is its center, with Europe and Japan on the wings, a balancing act that would ordinarily defy all laws of international gravity. It is much more than a polygamous military marriage of convenience in the face of a common foe, and more than an economic bonding. The alliance is based on a common commitment to democracy and, in the case of all but Japan, on a shared cultural heritage.

As independent states, the NATO members of the alliance understandably have differed with each other on occasions.* But the current problems are more serious and fundamental than those of previous years. To a great degree they reflect significant economic and military changes not only in the world as a whole but also in the relationships between the allies. Says U.S. Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield, the former Democratic chief of the Senate: "We can no longer expect responses like we used to get automatically from our allies."

Ironically, when the hostage crisis first erupted in early November, the allies did much of what Washington asked them to do. They joined in condemnations of the militants, acted as secret mediators with Tehran and voted in the U.N. Security Council for sanctions against Iran. Everyone was also in step when Washington decided to soften its policy toward Iran in the hopes of bolstering relatively moderate Iranian leaders like President Abolhassan Banisadr.

Sharp U.S. dismay with the allies began to mount when Washington reluctantly concluded that tough measures were becoming necessary because the Iranian moderates either would not or could not secure the release of the American hostages. Typical of the disheartening news from Iran was the report the White House received last week that the Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini was not planning to release the hostages until, after the U.S. elections in November. In a note at the end of March, Carter requested the allies to make public statements and use their diplomats in Tehran to pressure the Iranians. Says a White House aide: "We asked for prompt, complementary action but not necessarily simultaneous action."

The feeble response the Administration received in part prompted last week's diplomatic offensive, highlighted by the Carter European TV interview. Carter also telephoned allied leaders, speaking several times to some, such as West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. Notes were exchanged and allied ambassadors trooped back and forth from meetings at foreign ministries. Administration officials, meanwhile, were making little effort to disguise