REPARTEE WITH MAO

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As a matter of principle, Mao said, the U.S. had to sever relations with Taiwan if we wanted diplomatic U.S. had to sever relations with Taiwan if we wanted diplomatic relations with Peking. But this was not an insoluble dilemma. He was in no hurry about implementing his principles. "We can do without Taiwan for the time being, and let it come after 100 years. Why be in such great haste?" As for relations between Peking and Washington, they need not march to the slow drumbeat of internal Chinese disputes; there was no need to wait so long: "I think they need not take 100 years. But that is to be decided by you. We will not rush you." Was it another hint that normalization could be separated from the issue of Taiwan? And that the rate of normalizing relations was up to us? Lest we miss the point, he compared the situation in Taiwan with that in Hong Kong and Macao, where China was in no hurry either (and had, in fact, diplomatic relations with the countries "occupying" them). Taiwan was not an important issue, he said. "The overall international situation important."

Turning to Japan, Mao noted that his neighbor was inherently insecure and sensitive. "Their first priority is to have good relations with the U.S.," he said approvingly. "We only come second." The apostle of world revolutions would do his best to keep Japanese priorities that way; he did not want a free-floating Japan playing off other countries against each other.

After 2½ hours, Mao ended by returning to his opening theme: Would Watergate sap the authority of a President with whom he more or less agreed? What kind of new President might emerge from this turmoil? He was "suspicious" that isolationism might return if a Democrat took office.

Mao was particularly uneasy about possible American troop withdrawals from Europe, a perennial proposal of Senate Democrats. I said that essentially our foreign policy was nonpartisan; there might be a difference between our two parties in the willingness to be "very brutal very quickly in case there is a challenge." Mao mused that what I really meant was the willingness to risk war. I sought to curb the speculation: "We will not start a war." Mao was not all that pleased with such a reassurance: the Soviets, he said, "bully the weak, and are afraid of the tough." In other words, do not deprive Moscow of the fear that we might prove bellicose.

Chou En-lai disappeared from the direction of affairs within two months after my visit. The official explanation was illness. Throughout my entire visit, Chou had been uncharacteristically subdued. Was his tentativeness due to the knowledge that his cancer was drawing his physical life to a close? Or was it the result of his imminent political demise? Did Mao engineer it as he had with every other deputy, or did Chou yield to the inevitable, either political pressures or the specter of mortality?