A Soviet Nyet To the Games

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The Administration similarly doubts that the Soviet boycott seriously worsens the international climate. Its view is that the Kremlin leaders have been in a state of transition since Brezhnev's health began failing five years ago. Says one Administration adviser: "They have been poorly organized to make decisions involving important changes, so they just stick to the familiar," which primarily means raging at the U.S. Says another Reagan aide: "If they want to show pique, this [boycotting the Olympics] isn't a very dangerous way to do it." Reaganauts accept the idea that Moscow is signaling to the world a refusal to deal with the President. "That probably won't change until after the election," says one White House staffer. "Then they will have to reassess."

Maybe. But such comments are uncomfortably reminiscent of Administration predictions that the Soviets would never walk out of arms-control talks last fall, and once they had, that they would return to the bargaining table no later than March. The Administration's admitted surprise at the Soviet Olympic pullout proves once again that it is scarcely adept at gauging the thoughts and intentions of the men in the Kremlin—not that the rest of the world in this case did any better. And if the issue is hardly comparable in importance to nuclear arms negotiations, the boycott demonstrates a Soviet wish to dramatize superpower tensions that cannot comfort anyone, sports buff or not.

— By George J. Church. Reported Reported by Erik Amfitheatrof/Moscow, Laurence I. Barrett/Washington and Steven Holmes/Los Angeles, with other bureaus