Business & Finance: Race of Three

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The 1935 Ford is mechanically much like its predecessor in the Model 40 series. The motor is practically unchanged because, as the Founder said in a signed advertisement, ''We have not learned how to build a better one." Major improvements are in line and ride. Bodies are heavily streamlined, tires are bigger, hood louvers are set in a horizontal line. Like many another motormaker who learned from Walter P. Chrysler's Airflow models of last year Mr. Ford moved his engine forward about 8 in. over the front axle, thus equalizing the distribution of weight. In addition he lengthened the old transverse springs, mounted them ahead of the front axle and behind the rear axle, stretching the spring base to 123 in. but retaining the old 112-in. wheelbase.

But what made the 1935 Fords more interesting than other Fords was the fact that their maker announced last autumn with considerable fanfare that he planned to sell 1,000,000 of them—"or better"—in the third year of Roosevelt II. A dozen years ago when Chevrolet sales were 76,000 and Plymouth was not even an idea in Mr. Chrysler's head, Mr. Ford was turning out Model T's at the rate of 2,000,000 per year. But Chevrolet has outsold Ford in six of the past eight years, and the last million-car year at River Rouge was 1930. Last year Mr. Ford had a head start over Chevrolet, which was delayed by the tool & die strike. Yet in combined truck and passenger car sales Chevrolet again nosed out Ford. The most famed U. S, industrial box score (estimated for 1934 on eleven-month domestic sales) reads as follows:

1934 1933

Chevrolet 680,000 575,000

Ford 675,000 374,000

Plymouth 305,000 249,000

Said Mr. Ford in 1933: "I don' t know how many cars Chevrolet sold last year. I don't know how many they're selling this year. I don't know how many they may sell next year. And—I don't care."

Mr. Ford's indifference to his competitors is no pose. His sole interest is in building the best car he can for the money. To him merchandising is merely a necessary nuisance. If a person chooses to buy a Chevrolet or a Plymouth, the loss, Mr. Ford feels, is the buyer's, not his. Even the staggering deficits rolled up in the Depression—$132,000,000—do not bother him. It is, to Henry Ford, merely money "spent."

Mr. Ford's competitors, however, have stockholders to think of, and last year the Man of Dearborn increased his share of the national business from 20% in 1933 to 28% of all cars sold. Relatively, both Chevrolet and Plymouth lost ground. What they will do in 1935 no man knows.

Chevrolet is General Motors' biggest unit and the finest merchandising organization in the industry. The fact that President Marvin E. Coyle surmounted his early production difficulties and again pushed Chevrolet to the front of the field is generally regarded as the outstanding selling job of 1934. Now 48, dynamic, little-publicized President Coyle has been with G. M. for 23 years, 17 of them in Chevrolet. William S. Knudsen picked him as his successor when that all-round motorman stepped up to executive vice president of General Motors Corp.