THE NATIONS: Briefing for Washington

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On the eve of the Washington talks, the bullyragging and the bitter recriminations that had passed between the U.S. and Britain faded into an abashed mumble-grumble. On both sides of the Atlantic, hot words cooled off under the growing realization that the British crisis was a crisis for the whole Western world.

The British press, as if a little ashamed of its earlier behavior, paused to recall how much the U.S. had already done for Britain; the U.S. press reminded itself of the harsh fact that, if Britain went down in economic distress, dragging the great sterling bloc of nations with her, the U.S. economy would be sorely shaken, the free world's defenses critically weakened. Dean Acheson in Washington and Ernest Bevin in London argued that the need to maintain U.S.-British unity must influence economic decisions.

In this chastened mood, U.S. and British leaders gathered for the momentous conference which opens in Washington next week.

The Practical Approach. Last week an advance guard of experts was already at work in Washington, examining a preliminary statement of Britain's situation furnished by London. Sir Stafford Cripps, who will be the British delegation chairman, secluded himself in his Gloucestershire home, jotted down neat notes (appropriately in red ink) from a pile of Treasury briefs that mounted during the week from 20 to 42. He was reported, among other things, to be weighing the chances and consequences of a further slash in U.S. imports to slow the alarmingly rapid drain of his country's dollar reserves.

This week, after a cabinet session which approved a final statement of British policy at the conference, Cripps and Bevin headed for Washington. En route, aboard the Mauretania, they would whip their arguments into final shape.

Until Cripps and Bevin arrived, Washington could not be sure of the British position. But it was known that the British were veering toward a practical, circumspect approach. They were inclined to ask for only a little now in the way of special help from the U.S., in the hope of more later. Specifically, they would probably propose a larger British slice of the ECA pie for Europe, which OEEC is currently fighting over (see below); a freer hand in spending their ECA allotment; a cut in U.S. tariff duties on British goods, an easing of U.S. customs red tape, and permission to save dollars by discriminating more freely against certain imports from the U.S. (i.e., buying goods, instead, from America's competitors if they can furnish them more cheaply). Sir Stafford Cripps was still reported stubbornly opposed to devaluation of the pound, but there was growing feeling in Britain that devaluation, while a severe and only incomplete measure, might be a good thing in the long run.

The Three Hearts. The U.S. position was summed up by a waggish Washington newsman as having three hearts—the hard heart, represented by Treasury

Secretary John Snyder; the bleeding heart, carried by State's Dean Acheson; and the beating heart, displayed by ECA Administrator Paul Hoffman.

In top level briefings, on four successive afternoons in a State Department conference room, Acheson and Snyder listened to their experts lecture on the British crisis and all its implications.