ARMED FORCES: The Re-Enlistment Blues

"Got paid out on Monday, not a dog soljer no more," exults a barrack-room ballad in From Here to Eternity. But a few days later, his mustering-out pay gone, his new-found freedom turned sour, the pre-Pearl Harbor infantryman in James Jones's novel surrenders to The Re-Enlistment Blues and signs up.

In Washington last week a Senate appropriations subcommittee heard a 1956 version of the re-enlistment blues. As sung by Assistant Defense Secretary Carter L. Burgess, it was a different tune. It did not concern the "dog soljer"; it was about highly trained specialists whose skills range from running an infantry squad to directing propulsion operations on an atomic submarine. Re-enlistment rates, said Burgess, are dangerously low, particularly among the men who are the most expensive to train, whose capacities are greatest and whose talents would be "the most critical in modern war." Some of the statistics:

¶ Last summer 53% of the Army's "food service" personnel signed up again at the end of their first enlistments, but only 10% of its electronics specialists followed suit.

¶ In the Air Force 40% of all air police but only 5% of the atomic weapons specialists re-enlisted.

¶ Of the 43,800 commissioned officers whose tours of duty ended last year, 32,000 returned to civilian life; approximately 4,000 of them were jet pilots trained at a cost of $122,000 each.

¶ Of the 322,200 officers on active duty in all the services, only 89,000 are regulars (only 17% of the Air Force's commissioned personnel are career men), and most of the rest intend to become civilians again at the first opportunity.

Why don't more Americans choose the military for a career? The most important reason is the inability of the armed forces to match private industry's two brightest attractions: higher pay and better living conditions, especially for family men. To meet the problem, Burgess offered a couple of realistic solutions: require longer service but offer larger re-enlistment bonuses to highly skilled and hard-to-get specialists. Private industry could help, he believes, by undertaking more of its own training programs instead of using the armed forces as a training school.

As for the "dog soljer," Burgess would drop those unwilling or unable to absorb atom-age training. Said he: "We have no place for the half-lazy, the half-talented in today's complex military structure."

Where Burgess' suggestions counted most, they scored heavily. Members of the Senate subcommittee urged him to incorporate them in recommended legislation, promised full support when they reach Congress.