Foreign News: Fat Man's Challenge

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For weeks Western governments had known that the Russians were going to do it. Nikita Khrushchev had said as much to Harold Stassen, amidst the drinks and din of the party at Claridge's. But when the announcement came last week that the Soviet Union would reduce its armed forces by 1,200,000 men by May 1957, the response of the West was confused, contradictory and uncertain.

The British estimated that the action would reduce the Russians' total uniformed manpower by as much as one-third. The Russians themselves said it meant the disbandment of 63 divisions and brigades, including some 30,000 men stationed in East Germany. They said they also intend to mothball 375 naval vessels, deactivate three air divisions, cut armaments and military budgets. "Other governments," said the Russian statement, "insofar as they are sincerely willing to contribute to the strengthening of peace, cannot but follow suit."

Opposite Tacks. With a single voice, the West pointed out that by declaring the cut unilaterally, the Russians allowed no possibility of verifying whether they actually carry out their pledges. But the West seemed agreed on little else. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles first declared that he had predicted it, then suggested that the Russians might not go through with it, that even if they did, no one should let his guard down, ended by arguing that the Soviet striking power might even be increased by the transfer of these men from the armed forces to factories. A newsman demanded whether Dulles would rather these men stayed in the army. Said Dulles: "I would rather have them standing around doing guard duty than making atomic bombs."

In Britain, Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden took an almost opposite tack. "We welcome the Russian reductions," he said. "If it so happens that everybody starts to catch this habit, we shall have no objection. But I think we are entitled to say that we were the first to start it." And Minister of Defense Sir Walter Monckton, though conceding that the Russians would still have 237 divisions under arms v. NATO's 100, announced that Britain was reducing its armed forces by another 70,000 men.

In Europe's capitals the Russian cut was regarded confidently as genuine, for the reason that it made simple sense for the Russians themselves:

¶They don't need that many soldiers any more. With modern weapons, mass armies can safely be streamlined without any cost in striking power—as the U.S. did with its "new look" of two years ago—and the savings can be spent on other things, notably more air power, heightened missile development. In Britain, Khrushchev had grandly offered to sell the British cruisers like the one he came on. "Under modern conditions," grinned Khrushchev, doubtless reflecting the thinking of Russia's top military men, "the best thing a cruiser can be used for is to carry guests to a friendly country."