Southeast Asia: More of the Same And Hope for the Best

And Hope for the Best Once again U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara was back in Washington after a fact-finding trip (his fourth) to South Viet Nam. Gist of his recommendations, duly accepted by President Johnson: More of the same and hope for the best.

The U.S. will step up aid to Saigon by $30 million to $40 million a year (current rate: $500 million), will send in "limited but significant additional equipment" and provide more American combat advisers if necessary. While reporting "clear and unmistakable" evidence that the Viet Cong guerrillas are directed from Red North Viet Nam, Johnson did not follow up previous hints that the U.S. might carry the war to the north. Instead, he expressed the fervent hope that the new Premier, General Nguyen Khanh, will win the war in his own bailiwick, praised him for acting "vigorously and effectively."

It all sounded like a familiar refrain. But McNamara and his party were genuinely impressed with Khanh, returned convinced that he deserves wholehearted U.S. support. In Saigon, Khanh was at least trying to consolidate his leadership in ways big and small, and with a lot of brave talk. He dispatched his comely wife on visits to Vietnamese and American military hospitals, pleased Mekong Delta poultry farmers by halving the export tax on ducks, ordered the late President Diem's old palace converted into an arts and science museum. The little Premier also announced a tightening up of the influence-riddled draft system under which wealthy youths in Saigon have long dodged military service. "It is difficult to admit," said Khanh, "that there are two Viet Nams—one fighting in the countryside, the other in Saigon, feasting every night. In the fight against Communism, all must participate. We will not hesitate to shoot or give life imprisonment to those who have not awakened."

The Program. Khanh wants more manpower for several projects—all tall orders and all previously tried in various forms by either the French or Diem. Khanh promises to create "a highly trained guerrilla force that can beat the Viet Cong on its own ground," wants to strengthen the often timid paramilitary forces, such as hamlet militias. He has begun training a corps of civil administrators to rebuild war-shattered local governments. And he proposes to revive and improve Diem's strategic-hamlet program; however, instead of forcing peasants into the armed compounds, Khanh says he will make the program voluntary, and he wants to make it less passive.

The overall plan, which the U.S. terms "clear and hold," is to establish base areas, called "oil spots" or "ink blots" by Khanh, and slowly spread government influence to surrounding Viet Cong territory (see following story). McNamara is convinced that the "ink blot" program can work, although he concedes that "they do not yet know where to put all the blots."

Khanh last week also launched diplomatic moves to repair relations with his country's two neutralist neighbors, Laos and Cambodia, and, if possible, to slow the flow of Communist men and matériel that keep filtering through.