Foreign Relations: We Are Ready

Amid the ups and downs of the Berlin crisis, relationships between Bonn and Washington became flawed. U.S. talk about the need for Berlin negotiations led Adenauer to fear that President Kennedy was prepared to make concessions at German expense. Washington was irked by Bonn's unwillingness to get down to discussions, and by West German demands for nuclear arms. To make matters worse, Kennedy and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had never achieved any particular personal understanding. On a visit to Washington last April, the Chancellor appeared unsure of the new President, talked largely in guarded generalities about U.S.-German problems. But last week, during a three-day strenuous trip to Washington, most of the U.S.-German conflicts were resolved.

Doing Business. This time, Adenauer came to do business. He spent 13 hours in on-and-off discussions so private that even West Germany's Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder was kept mostly in the dark about what went on. After one of Adenauer's meetings with Kennedy, Schröder approached the Chancellor to ask what the talk had been about, got a frosty brushoff. "My dear fellow," said Adenauer, "it was a private conversation. If I told you, it would no longer be private."

But the tenor of the talk was clear. Coming to the White House, Adenauer had only vague ideas about what subjects could be negotiated with the Russians, but some very firm thoughts about what ought not to be discussed with them: recognition of East Germany, confirmation of the Oder-Neisse line as the boundary between Poland and Germany, establishment of Central Europe as a neutral zone. To the old man's delight, Kennedy agreed to keep such issues out of any discussion on Berlin—although they might be considered in future talks on some larger issue, such as reunification of Germany.

Both men agreed that the basic Western rights—access to West Berlin, the freedom of the city, the privilege of garrisoning Allied troops there—were not negotiable; they also agreed to discuss with the Russians some new contractual arrangement that would make those rights less subject to misinterpretation. Privately and sadly, Adenauer and Kennedy admitted that the West would have to accept the presence of The Wall as a bitter but ineradicable fact of Berlin life.*

A few smaller issues were left unresolved. Adenauer promised to strengthen West Germany's NATO contribution from eight to twelve divisions; but he was brusquely turned down in his demand to have some share in the decision to use NATO's nuclear capability if ever a hot war began. Kennedy suggested that West Germany consider making more economic and commercial contact with East Germany; Adenauer demurred, on the ground that any further relationship would approach de facto recognition of the Ulbricht regime. The two disagreed on the need for closer ties between West Berlin and West Germany; Kennedy argued that any further efforts to tie the city to Bonn might stir the Soviets into fresh reprisals. As gently as he could, Kennedy suggested that Adenauer should start to groom a successor; Adenauer merely promised to think the matter over.