INDUSTRY: Woes of the Atlas

The biggest bottleneck in the U.S. missile program is not the development or testing of the giant birds—which have been firing successfully—but construction of the bases that would be needed to send them winging against an enemy. The U.S. now has six operational Atlas intercontinental ballistic missiles—and by schedule should now have 18. Later this year twelve Atlases will be operational, whereas there should be more than 30. Last week 56 top executives of companies that make the Atlas and its launching sites returned home from Washington after a rousing pep talk from Defense Secretary Thomas S. Gates Jr. urging them to get the Atlas back on schedule. The chief problem, conceded Air Force Brigadier General William E. Leonhard, a deputy commander of the Ballistic Missile Division, is "the difficulties of doing a wartime task under peacetime conditions and authority."

Like Building Dams? The Atlas' woes show that it takes more than a big budget and brainy scientists to win the missile race. One of the chief difficulties has been the lack of central direction. The Air Force Ballistic Missile Division, after approving the plans of the prime contractor, turns the job of letting construction contracts over to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The Air Force and the Army engineers each blame the other for the delays. The Army charges that the Air Force makes impossible demands, frequently changes its mind; the Air Force replies that the Army engineers are trying to build bases as they build dams.

Both the Army and the Air Force give the contractors poor marks. The Convair division of General Dynamics Corp., one of the prime contractors for the Atlas, has come under criticism for placing so much stress on test shots at Cape Canaveral that it has not put enough effort into preparing missile bases. Construction contractors selected by the Corps of Engineers often farmed the work to subcontractors who underestimated the task, sometimes buckled under the pressure. At Offutt Air Force Base near Omaha, where Atlas launching sites are three months behind schedule, New York's Malan-Grove Construction Co. gave 90% of the work to 46 subcontractors. Two of them ran into financial difficulties and are now being operated by bonding companies. At the Offutt launching sites, nine concrete pedestals intended for support of liquid-oxygen lines had to be replaced because they had inadequate supporting steel. Warren Air Force Base in Cheyenne, Wyo., scheduled to be the first operational tactical missile base by last spring, will not be ready until fall, largely because contractors could not fulfill their commitments.

No Ready Mix. For their part, the contractors complain bitterly that they are often not paid on time for their work, are burdened by the complexity of the new sites (some 4,000 miles of wire and 25,000 connections) and by whole chains of changes that are set off when something new is discovered during a missile firing. The changes are necessary if the U.S. is to keep its bases as sophisticated as its developing missiles, but they can play hob with schedules. At Offutt base, more than 50 site changes have been ordered, ranging from "a few dollars to more than a million dollars." The Warren base, originally scheduled to cost $65 million, is now expected to cost $100 million because of numerous modifications.