The War: Pulling Together

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Ho's reply was as polemical as Johnson's was restrained. "Half a million U.S. and satellite troops have resorted to the most inhuman weapons and the most barbarous methods of warfare," he charged. Accusing the U.S. of "monstrous crimes" and of waging a "war of aggression," Ho insisted that he would not consider peace talks unless the U.S. "unconditionally" halted its bombing of the North and "all other acts of war."

Ho's intemperate, irrational language only underscored the President's seriousness and perseverance in seeking an end to the war. Even his longtime antagonist on Viet Nam, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright, acknowledged that Johnson's approach had been "very reasonable." One of the few voices raised against the Administration was, not unexpectedly, that of New York's Democratic Senator Robert F. Kennedy, who maintained that Johnson had raised the price for peace talks by adding "the further condition that we have evidence that Hanoi has already ceased infiltration before we stop the bombing."

Emasculating Process. Johnson did indeed raise the price for talks—but he did it 14 months ago, when he decided that the U.S. would be ill advised to offer Hanoi a bombing pause in return for nothing more than a vague promise of negotiations. At that time, the President began demanding some form of de-escalation from Hanoi in exchange for calling off the bombers. His latest message did not go beyond that demand; it merely spelled out one possible form that de-escalation could take.

Johnson's hand was strengthened further during the week by two statements lending support to his present policy. One came from Socialist Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, who conceded in Tokyo that some Southeast Asian nations "may well prefer some permanent American military presence" to a repetition of "the process that is emasculating South Viet Nam." The other statement was made on the floor of the U.S. Senate.

Far from Easy. There, Massachusetts Republican Edward W. Brooke, the only Negro in the chamber, rose to deliver his maiden speech. Fresh from a two-week Asian tour, Brooke recalled that in the past he had often argued that the U.S. "ought to take the first step toward creating a better climate for negotiations," possibly by halting its bombing of the North. But, he said, "everything I learned, not only in South Viet Nam but also in Japan, the Republic of China, the Colony of Hong Kong, Cambodia and Thailand, has now convinced me that the enemy is not disposed to participate in any meaningful negotiations at this time." That being the case, he continued, "I reluctantly conclude that the general direction of our present military efforts in Viet Nam is necessary. This is far from an easy position for me to take."

It was all the more difficult because most Negro leaders are opposed to the President on the war. Nevertheless, Brooke noted that "those most familiar with the East Asian mentality are convinced that the enemy still waits, still aspires to victory through collapse of the American will. Let there be no doubt in the mind of Ho Chi Minh or anyone else that the American people will persevere in their fundamental support of the South Vietnamese."