World: THE PUZZLE OF THE LULL

FOR the sixth week, the battlefields of South Viet Nam continued to be un-accustomedly quiet. There was, declared General Creighton Abrams, the U.S. commander in Viet Nam, "decreased activity" on the enemy's part. "But what it means I don't know," he added. Other experts, in Washington and in Saigon, share the general's puzzlement. Was this finally the long-awaited Communist signal for military de-escalation of the conflict and thus a hopeful step toward peace? Or was it, as in the past, simply a period of Communist rebuilding and refitting in preparation for yet another offensive?

U.S. officers in Viet Nam are reluctant to use the term "lull" for the lack of contact with the Communists, but they readily admit that all their military indicators are down. Since June 29, weekly American fatalities have held below 200. During the last reporting period, July 20 to 26, 110 Americans died, the lowest toll so far this year. Communist attacks in III Corps, the vital area around Saigon, have dropped from a daily average of 30 in May to 25 in June and 15 in July. The other three corps areas report a similar trend. Nightly shellings of allied bases have diminished. Allied reconnaissance patrols find little or nothing. A running fight last week west of Saigon, in which 116 Communist soldiers were killed, was the sharpest battle in a month.

Another Push. Statistics have dipped before—only to soar again when the Communists started new offensives. During the period between October 1968 and February 1969, U.S. casualties were relatively low and there was talk then, as today, of a lull. At the time, U.S. commanders warned that the Communists were preparing for another push. Indeed, the lull ended abruptly—and bloodily—with the Communist post-Tet offensive. This time, however, more seems to be involved. "This lull is not merely one of statistics, but more of gut feeling," reports TIME Correspondent Burton Pines from Saigon. "Some of the highest American military commanders, after citing caveats drawn from previous lulls, will admit that something is now different."

For the first time in years, the American command is not predicting the date of the next expected offensive. The reason is that the usual sources of intelligence—captured documents, prisoners and deserters—reveal virtually nothing. The most that can be gleaned is that local Communist commanders have heard of vague plans for a new drive some time in the fall.

So far, Hanoi and the Communist negotiators at the Paris peace talks have offered no hint that the lull has any political significance. Given the Communist reticence, U.S. experts in Washington and Saigon advance three theories to explain the lull: