South Viet Nam: A New Kind of War

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The Elusive Target. The basic U.S. strategy in Viet Nam today, now that its defensive enclaves are secured, is to go over to the offensive, hitting out from the bases in fairly large-scale thrusts at main V.C. striking forces—to break them up, keep them off balance, erode their influence. For the present, the U.S. is less interested in expanding its geography than in wearing down the enemy. The priority targets, as the U.S. sees them now: first, the U.S. Marines' Hué-Danang-Chu Lai area, then as much of Binh Dinh province as can be cleared, finally the Hop Tac region around Saigon.

The very success of U.S. firepower so far is likely to make big kills harder and harder to come by, as Operation Concord in Binh Dinh province last week proved. An estimated 45,000 Viet Cong have been in Binh Dinh, and in the largest operation of the war, 14,000 allied troops went in at three points to try to kill a sizable batch of them. Two hundred helicopters made 358 sorties to drop 5,500 men into Suoi Ca Valley, where a V.C. regiment was reported. Another 2,500 of the First Team were out to clear "Happy Valley" next door to the west, while Vietnamese marines and army battalions closed in from the coast. But as all too often in the frustrating war, there was virtually nobody home. Even where the enemy is decisively smashed, unless allied troops stay, the V.C. soon slip back.

After the Shooting. The real reason that the battle for Viet Nam is only beginning is that battles themselves are only the beginning. When the shooting stops, some sort of Vietnamese authority, ideally local police, must be ready to move in at once to keep the hamlet secure from the V.C. After security, the needs multiply: reconstruction of the local economy, land reform, better food and medical care, schools, the beginnings of justice. "In order to win," in the long run, says Ky, "there must be a full social revolution in Viet Nam—our revolution, no one else can do it for us." U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge agrees, and a large part of his working day and that of the U.S. mission is spent in helping the Vietnamese lay the foundations for their own revolution. "These people," says Lodge, "have always had a strong sense of peoplehood. What we are now trying to give them is a strong sense of nationhood."

U.S. officials estimate that if pacification is really going to work, ultimately each district (comparable to an American county) will need at least 200 administrators, public health officers, teachers and engineers. South Viet Nam has 220 districts, so 45,000 trained men will be needed. Nowhere near that many are in sight.