HISTORICAL NOTES: How Kissinger Handled a War

Yet when he is out there on the stage, being cheered as a global lion-tamer, he cannot resist the temptation to join in the applause. Once at a large Washington dinner a man walked up to him and said, "Dr. Kissinger, I want to thank you for saving the world." "You 're welcome," he replied.

So concludes the introduction to Kissinger, a breezy, sometimes biting but largely admiring and affectionate portrait of the Secretary of State in action to be published August 23 by Little, Brown. Its authors are CBS Correspondents Marvin and Bernard Kalb, and their aim is not history or biography, but careful journalism with final judgments held to a minimum. Marvin, 44, and Bernard, 52, have followed Kissinger around the world for CBS and have had access to a wide range of sources, including Kissinger himself, though the Secretary had no part hi the book's writing or editing. Their account of Kissinger ranges across his full career in the Nixon Administration, but the freshest and most controversial of their chapters deals with Kissinger's handling of the 1973 war in the Middle East. It is a vivid picture of the Secretary of State at work under fire, juggling policies and priorities.

The Kalb brothers assert that "on Sept. 22 [Egyptian President Anwar] Sadat informed [Soviet Party Chief Leonid] Brezhnev that the war would begin on Oct. 6. As far as one can tell, the Russian leader raised no objections." Although "there was a steady flow of intelligence indicating plans for an imminent Egyptian-Syrian attack, the political leaders of Israel and the United States, incredibly, failed to recognize it." On Oct. 5, Kissinger was at the Waldorf Towers in New York City for the General Assembly session. He did not receive a report from Ray Cline, then head of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, concluding that the war would start the following day or even sooner because "no one wanted to take the responsibility for disturbing the Secretary in New York on a Friday evening after hours."

At 6 the next morning, Kissinger was awakened by news from U.S. Ambassador to Israel Kenneth Keating that war was imminent. Kissinger called the President and on Nixon's instructions telephoned the Israeli and Egyptian Foreign Ministers, urging "restraint." With Israel's Abba Eban, he added the extra warning: "Don't pre-empt."

First Blows. Kissinger remained dubious that the Arabs were going to attack, and at 7 a.m. he warned the Israeli charge d'affaires in Washington: "Don't ever start the war. Don't ever preempt. If you fire the first shot, you won't have presidential support. You'll be alone, all alone. We wouldn't be able to help you. Don't pre-empt."