Nation: Trying to Build Confidence

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attempt? Blumenthal's defense of the plan is notably un inspiring: "Don't call it a mouse too fast. There won't be a loving embrace of the plan, but there will be a cautious and sober willingness to give it a try. We're going to fail in the fight against inflation unless we can find a way for people to say 'We're all in this together and we're going to collaborate to solve it.'" In all economic policymaking, a key consideration is balance between conflicting goals and clashing claims. Balance was precisely the quality that the Administration's procedures lacked in the early days. Carter then would consult with aides singly—White House Assistant James Schlesinger, who is now Secretary of Energy, on fuel policy, Labor Secretary Ray Marshall on minimum-wage legislation —and reach decisions without weighing sufficiently the impact that the programs they suggested might have on the economy. Blumenthal suffered as much as anyone from this presidential propensity. In public, he loyally though unenthusiastically supported Carter's plan for a $50-per-person tax rebate last spring, advising one Senator to "hold your nose and vote for it," only to have the President suddenly pull the rug from under him by abruptly abandoning the proposal.

Just how much coordination Blumenthal can now bring to the policymaking process is still problematic. In all likelihood neither he nor anyone else in the Carter Administration will ever play as dominant a role in shaping economic programs as Secretaries of the Treasury John Connally and George Shultz did under Richard Nixon. Though Carter is getting over his penchant for trying to decide every aspect of every program, and is delegating more authority to Blumenthal and others, he still immerses himself in the details of economic policy more than Presidents generally do. While the budget was being prepared, the President carefully studied 25 black briefing books averaging 150 pages each, and scribbled in the margins such comments as "Let's not do that. JC." He also invited middle-level officials to meetings on departmental budgets, and encouraged them to debate figures with him while their bosses listened.

But Blumenthal's steering committee has established enough authority in selecting the choices to be presented to the President to disgruntle Labor Secretary Marshall and Commerce Secretary Juanita Kreps, who complain that they have been cut out of economic policy-making by not being invited to the Thursday-morning breakfasts. Within the committee, Blumenthal has no visible rival for preeminence. Charles Schultze these days often secludes himself in his office, and McIntyre sticks strictly to budget matters.

That leaves Blumenthal not only the chief policy planner but the Administration's unofficial ambassador to business as well. Though Blumenthal's background might seem to fit him perfectly for the job, he has yet to master the assignment. Many businessmen still blame him for much of the Administration's early waffling, especially about the dollar. Blumenthal's December decision to support the greenback represented something of a conversion. Earlier he had taken the lead in arguing that the dollar's slide was no cause for alarm, and he made the point more strongly than he may have intended; he gave many businessmen the impression that