Meeting At Camp David

• Share

(5 of 10)

Begin rival, and Opposition Labor Party Leader Shimon Peres. The Egyptian President also began sniping at his Israeli counterpart, asserting: "It is possible to establish peace in hours. The only obstacle is Mr. Begin."

In July there seemed to be some progress in Vance's talks with Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and Egypt's Kamel at Leeds Castle in England. Then Sadat shook Washington by expelling the Israeli military mission from Egypt and stating that there could be no further talks with the Israelis until they agreed to evacuate all Arab territory.

The U.S. publicly criticized Sadat, saying that it was "very disappointed" by his action. The Israelis gloated that Sadat's moves showed that it was he and not Begin who was blocking a peace. The Administration disagreed. But it also worried lest the deadlock make Sadat and other Arab moderates vulnerable to radical demands for action; it is even possible that the Egyptian might be toppled or killed. And so Carter decided to gamble on a summit. Explains a top State Department aide: "We had to keep the momentum going to keep the moderates in."

The main issues still dividing Israel and Egypt are substantial. That is apparent in the differing proposals that each country has made in the past year (see box). Both Begin and Sadat declared on the eve of Camp David that they would stick by these proposals. Although the U.S. does not anticipate much flexibility in either side's opening position, it certainly hopes they will modify their views on some key points.

One of the easiest such points, perhaps, is the Sinai. Israel is prepared to let nearly all the area revert to Egypt, though it claims the right to maintain two military bases and several civilian settlements there. But even on this relatively simple matter, Sadat insists that he cannot sign a bilateral agreement with Jerusalem. He wants to link a Sinai accord with at least some progress (from the Arab viewpoint) on other fronts. By this he hopes to avoid charges that he is betraying the interests of other Arabs for the sake of a deal with Israel. Sadat thus has been trying to get Begin to accept a declaration of principles that at least sketches the framework of an ultimate peace settlement in Gaza and the West Bank. Their inability to agree on such a declaration was the main reason for the failure of last December's Sadat-Begin summit at Ismailia.

Sadat sees the declaration of principles as an essential step toward an eventual Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, because the declaration would, in effect, affirm Arab sovereignty over the lands. He said to the Knesset, "Our land does not yield itself to bargaining . . . We insist on complete withdrawal from these territories."

Begin, who repeatedly professes his willingness to negotiate about anything, has proved very elusive about any acknowledgement of Arab sovereignty over the West Bank. The only "concession" Israel has granted came at the Leeds Castle meeting. Instead of merely being willing to negotiate "the nature of the future relations" after a five-year transition period, Dayan said there, Israel would be prepared to discuss "the question of sovereignty." This minute change of nuance satisfied neither the U.S. nor Egypt. Sadat had by then concluded that Begin had no intention of