Meeting At Camp David

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muster to smooth over the sharp and often irritating personal differences of his two visitors. Sadat is an emotional and visionary leader who at times sounds so mystical that Israelis snidely refer to him as sitting upon "his pharaonic throne." Preferring to deal in broad strokes and principles, Sadat quickly tires of the legalistic details that are often essential to translate a belief into a program. The Israeli Premier is no less visionary, but he is also a product of the Talmudic tradition. He almost seems to revel in analytical disputations about minutiae.

Not surprisingly, Begin and Sadat did not really hit it off well during their meetings in Jerusalem and Ismailia. They certainly tried to be as friendly as possible; in Ismailia, for example, Sadat even got behind the wheel of a car and personally drove Begin around the city, pointing out sights. But despite the efforts, the two have had great difficulty communicating. Their misunderstanding of each other's statements on such issues as the status of Israeli troops and settlements in the Sinai has led to bitter recriminations.

Because of this, Carter plans to be present for all sessions between the two, although he certainly will not object if they want to meet privately. Said one U.S. diplomat: "They can be awfully antagonistic when they're alone together. They've talked without note takers and there's been tremendous confusion and misunderstanding later about what was said and who meant what. We hope we can avoid a repeat of this by channeling all direct contact through Carter." One problem is that while Carter is fond of Sadat, he does not much like Begin, whom, he feels, has been less than candid.

Carter, of course, will not only have to moderate the personality differences between Begin and Sadat but he will also have to bring the two closer together on the major substantive questions. To pick the moment and choose the issue for his interventions in the discussion, he will need a masterly sense of timing and nuance, a quality that he has not yet definitively demonstrated. He may be helped by the powerful mystique of his office. Explained one Administration aide involved in the summit: "There is something unique about the position of the presidency, and both the other guys know it."

The President is not planning to put any overall American proposal on the bargaining table because that would probably lead to cries of an "imposed peace." But if other efforts fail, he may issue a declaration describing U.S. "ideas" for a comprehensive peace. He much prefers, however, simply to make suggestions on crucial points and try to steer the talks toward a balanced outcome.

In the key issue of Arab sovereignty vs. Israeli security, for example, he will try to nudge his visitors into trading Israeli concessions on the West Bank and Gaza for Egyptian compromises on Sinai and security for Israel. This could prompt creative talk about such concepts as Israeli phased withdrawals in return for confidence-building good will gestures by the Arabs. Further discussion could attempt to define which Palestinians would participate in the West Bank's administrative agencies and what Egyptian measures might strengthen Israel's security. The Administration has become increasingly sympathetic to Israeli security needs and recognizes that some