Meeting At Camp David

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long-term residual Israeli presence in the occupied territories may be required. Carter will also press Begin for a much clearer idea of the status he envisions for the West Bank after the five-year transition period that both sides agree on.

The result of this bargaining, Carter hopes, will be a formula calling for the transfer from Israel to moderate Palestinians of authority over the West Bank and Gaza. While these Palestinians will enjoy some self-determination, they will not be able to turn their area into an independent state, at least not for a predetermined and rather lengthy period.

Carter will also be watching for openings that can lead to a separate Egyptian-Israeli peace. Begin would welcome this—he calls it a "permanent partial peace"—but Sadat has always balked, fearing a backlash from the other Arab states. While U.S. officials doubt that the Egyptian can be coaxed from his position, one Administration staffer advised: "We'll have to see if Sadat's resolve slips."

At times Carter may find that the two other leaders are willing to consider his suggestions even though they have previously rejected very similar ideas. Or so, at least, run the hopes of some Washington experts. Explains Joseph Sisco, President of American University and former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs: "Each side likes to camouflage a concession, and it's easier to say yes to Carter than to a proposal from the other side. The concession then bears U.S. markings and not those of the enemy." If, in fact, Carter asks the Israelis to relent and accept the declaration of principles that Sadat has been demanding, there is a good chance that they will do so if the statement is given some new name like "framework for negotiations" or "set of guidelines." That way it will not seem as if Begin is giving in to a Sadat demand.

On the other hand, there may come a moment at Camp David when Carter finds that his suggestions and proddings are not having any effect. At this point, the President may offer to involve the U.S. more directly in the Middle East if that will ease some of the anxieties afflicting Begin and Sadat. The U.S. could, for example, sign a defense treaty guaranteeing the existence of Israel. Or the U.S. could contribute troops, if Begin changes his mind, to a U.N. force that might be stationed in Sinai, Gaza and West Bank buffer zones. Another possibility would be to send U.S. civilians to man strategic monitoring stations in the West Bank, just as some 200 Americans now do in the Sinai. Finally, the U.S. might be willing to establish an air or naval base in Egypt or Israel. Not only would this dramatically symbolize the American commitment to the area's stability but it would also provide the U.S. with an enhanced strategic reach at a time when the U.S.S.R. has been increasing its activity on the rim of the Middle East.

Carter will offer direct U.S. guarantees only reluctantly—and, preferably at the end of the bargaining process, in order to conclude a deal. He is in no rush to dispatch G.I.s to patrol a truce, a step that has no certainty of congressional backing. Potential opposition on Capitol Hill, moreover, is not the only limitation on what Carter can propose at the summit. If he presses Begin too hard, he runs the political risk of alienating influential American