Meeting At Camp David

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Jews. Last October, for example, when the U.S. and U.S.S.R. issued a statement on the Middle East that displeased Israel, the White House was inundated with 7,268 angry telegrams and 827 phone calls in just four days. On the other hand, Carter also cannot ignore Sadat's primary protector, Saudi Arabia. Washington has carefully cultivated a close relationship with the Saudis, and they have supported U.S. interests by blocking sharp increases in the price of oil and supporting the international role of the dollar.

Sadat and Begin, of course, also negotiate under constraints. While the Israeli leader currently enjoys widespread popularity at home, his ability to make concessions seems limited by his narrow ideological outlook and his three decades of uncompromising rhetoric. As for Sadat, he can scarcely afford to dismiss Saudi Arabia's opposition to a separate Egyptian-Israeli peace. The Saudis, who fear that such an accord would isolate Egypt and weaken the force of moderation in the Arab world, provide Cairo with lavish handouts (roughly $1 billion per year).

But Sadat is also under pressure to show progress toward a settlement. Otherwise he will disappoint his people, who are weary of recurring wars and have enthusiastically supported his peace initiative. This is an especially bad time for him to risk a drop in popularity; after his country's students return to their campuses next month, leftist radicals and Islamic fanatics are expected to try to launch a campaign of public disorder.

With the negotiators under such constraints and the problems confronting them so difficult, is there much chance of Camp David succeeding? The answer to a large extent depends on the definition of success.

A great success, in the opinion of U.S. officials, would be for Begin and Sadat to agree on a set of principles outlining: 1) a settlement of the territorial issues of Sinai, Gaza and the West Bank and 2) satisfactory security arrangements for Israel. Serious problems, of course, would still remain to be resolved. But having the set of principles agreed on would greatly aid Sadat in persuading Jordan's King Hussein and eventually Syria's President Assad to join the negotiating process. As much as U.S. experts would like to see Camp David achieve this kind of success, they feel that there is little chance of it.

Similarly, there is only a slight chance, in the opinion of U.S. officials, of a catastrophic failure—a personal blowup, for example, with Sadat and Begin yelling at each other. Nearly as bad would be adamant Egyptian and Israeli refusals to consider any compromises; that could well lead to a rapid collapse of the talks and adjournment after only a day or two.

The most likely outcome, in the view of these U.S. experts, would be substantial clarification of several key issues: 1) the degree of autonomy the residents of the West Bank and Gaza will have during the five-year transition period; 2) the rights of the West Bank Palestinians after the transition; 3) provisions for Israeli security forces inside the West Bank and Gaza; and 4) the next steps in the negotiations. This would be considered a satisfactory success. If the participants, however, accomplish no more than agreeing to continue peace talks at a later date, high-level Administration officials believe the summit will have been a disappointment. The Egyptians agree.