Time Essay: The Symbolism of the Siege

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James Schlesinger sardonically seconds Andrew Young's nomination of Khomeini for sainthood, saying that the Ayatullah has accomplished a "miracle" by uniting the American people. Not really. The U.S. is unified in its indignation, but indignation is not a foreign policy or a military strategy. Nor is there any sign that the country is united in a new determination to fight blackmail by oil with the self-discipline and self-sacrifice of energy conservation. On the looming but still largely hypothetical question of exactly what the U.S. should do next, even if all the hostages are freed, there is no stunning national consensus. There is, however, a nationwide, perhaps worldwide, predisposition to criticize Carter for softness if his response is restrained and cautious. Never mind that restraint and caution are precisely what is called for. Overreaction would exacerbate the turmoil in Iran and the instability of the region, which in turn could escalate into a conflict with the Soviet Union. That is the essence of Carter's dilemma: how to behave responsibly without looking weak. In a way, it is unfair, but as Carter (like John Kennedy before him) has said, life is unfair. The problem is especially unfair for a President who—throughout his stewardship and despite the virtues of individual policies—has failed to convey an overreaching sense of strength and cogency in his foreign policy as a whole.

—Strobe Talbott