The World: POISED BETWEEN PEACE AND WAR

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The South African Prime Minister, too, had been concerned about the drift toward conflict in southern Africa. He had previously tried, with some success, to establish trade and even diplomatic ties with black Africa. In time, he believed, black African countries would cease to regard South Africa as a pariah and would recognize that it had much in wealth and expertise to offer the black countries in return for detente. Like Rhodesia, South Africa has a white minority government; but while Rhodesia has 274,000 whites, South Africa has 4.3 million (as well as 18 million blacks, 2.4 million "coloreds" of mixed race and 800,000 Asians). Moreover, the whites of South Africa have been on the continent for more than 300 years and have no other homeland.

But Vorster's tentative efforts at detente with black Africa have been stalled by his unwillingness — or inability — to pursue a domestic detente with the blacks in his own country. This year black Africa was shocked by the rioting that broke out in Johannesburg's Soweto township in June and has continued sporadically in South Africa's black and colored townships ever since. At last count, 380 people have been killed in the violence since June, all but three of them nonwhite.

More than that, South Africa has been criticized for its close ties with Rhodesia and Namibia (or South West Africa), the onetime League of Nations-mandated territory that South Africa has ruled since 1920. In fact, the U.N. threatened to impose economic sanctions on South Africa this year unless Pretoria produced an independence plan for Namibia in a hurry. Vorster reluctantly concluded some time ago that he should bow to the inevitable and press for black majority rule in both Rhodesia and Namibia. Together, Vorster and Kissinger convinced Ian Smith during their meetings that he must give up his hopeless fight for his country's good.

Vorster had previously withdrawn helicopter pilots from Rhodesia; for several months, South African railways had been unable to handle Rhodesian exports on schedule. The next turn of the screw, if Pretoria deemed it necessary, could be a squeeze on the flow of imports, including arms. Smith understood that if Pretoria felt strongly that he must capitulate, he was finished.

On Namibia, Kissinger's job was to try to get South Africa and SWAPO (South West African People's Organization), the Namibian guerrilla organization that is recognized by the U.N., to sit down at the same conference table, perhaps in Geneva, and work out their differences. Though such a meeting is not yet scheduled, Kissinger believes it will take place soon.