Chrysler's Crisis Bailout

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The congressional debate will resurrect all the arguments for and against giving federal aid to any company. There is a strong case that such help rewards failure and penalizes success, puts a dull edge on competition, is unfair to an ailing company's competitors and their shareholders, and inexorably leads the Government deeper into private business. Why should a huge company be bailed out, say critics, while thousands of smaller firms suffer bankruptcy every year? Where should the Government draw the line? GM Chairman Thomas A. Murphy has attacked federal help for Chrysler as "a basic challenge to the philosophy of America."

Hearing that, the UAW'S Fraser, with equal hyperbole, called Murphy a "horse's ass." In short, emotions are high, and there are no clear, simple answers.

Supporters of aid argue with passion that the U.S. cannot afford the failure of a company that is the nation's tenth largest manufacturer, its biggest builder of military tanks and one of only three major domestic competitors in its supremely important automotive industry. A Congressional Budget Office study concluded last week that a complete Chrysler shutdown would cost 360,000 workers their jobs immediately, and that ripple effects throughout the economy could throw an equal number out of work.

Yet all those arguments can be countered. Even if Chrysler were to fail, another company would take over its tank business; the domestic auto industry would remain competitive because Volkswagen is expanding production in the U.S.; other auto manufacturers would enlarge their production—and hire plenty of workers to meet it. Still, the threat of unemployment, even if temporary and spotty, was the decisive point for Administration policymakers in this preelection, recession year.

Congress can also consider that if Chrysler fails, the federal Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. may have to assume responsibility for about $800 million in insured but unfunded pension obligations to the auto company's employees. "That would be catastrophic," warned one agency official. To pay the bill, the PBGC would have to get special congressional approval to raise the fees that it charges for insuring other companies' pension funds.

Since Chrysler, by its own reckoning, is now spending at a rate of about $100 million a month, guarantees for even $750 million in new debts (on which interest would have to be paid) will not go very far. Next year the company will have to repay or renegotiate $303 million in European loans and $284 million in U.S. borrowings. The prospects are good that the company, after a hard fight, will win congressional approval for aid in 1979. But the chances are also strong that hungry Chrysler, like Oliver Twist, will return for more some time next year.