DIPLOMACY: Castro: The Pressure Begins to Work

High on the list of Henry Kissinger's geopolitical worries this year has been the continued presence of Cuban troops in Angola. To the Secretary of State, this Soviet-backed force of more than 13,000 well-armed soldiers has been a threat to the stability of southern Africa and a proxy of Moscow, through which the Soviets could extend their influence across the continent. Last week, in the midst of an unusually relaxed and relatively uneventful nine-day diplomatic odyssey through Europe, Kissinger unexpectedly learned that Dictator Fidel Castro's African adventurism might be a fading worry. In Stockholm, he heard from Swedish Premier Olof Palme that Cuban troops were being gradually withdrawn from Angola. Some Western diplomats interpreted the news as a vindication of Kissinger's strategy of rhetorical pressure—his loud and vigorous protests to both Moscow and Havana that the U.S. would not tolerate continued Cuban intervention in African affairs.

Palme learned of Cuba's plans in a personal letter from Castro, which stated that Cuban troops were leaving Angola at the rate of 200 per week. Following Castro's instructions, Palme read Kissinger parts of the letter, but did not then show it to him. The Swedish Premier quoted Castro as writing that Cubans "are not going to be 20th century crusaders," and that they had no plans to send troops anywhere else in Africa or Latin America.

Repeated Warnings. Kissinger guardedly called this "a positive development" and asked the CIA to determine whether the Cubans were, hi fact, withdrawing their soldiers. If they were leaving at the rate set by Castro, their ranks could be halved by the end of this year and down to a handful by mid-1977.

Kissinger speculated that several factors might have been involved in Castro's decision: "Cuba had to recognize that its relationship with the U.S. was deteriorating to a serious point, that we were determined to prevent any further military adventures and also that other African states agreed with our policy that African development should be left to African nations." Zaire and Zambia, for instance, have been urging Luanda's new leaders to begin easing the Cubans out of Angola.

Moscow, which urged the Cubans to enter the Angola civil war, may also have played a role in the announced withdrawal. Many Kremlinologists believe that Soviet Boss Leonid Brezhnev discussed Africa with Castro when the Cuban visited the Kremlin for the Soviet Union's Party Congress last February. Apparently, the Cuban-Russian decision was a response to repeated warnings from Washington that the continued presence of Castro's troops in Angola was giving powerful ammunition to American critics of detente, notably Ronald Reagan.

If the Cubans are really withdrawing, the U.S. is sure to re-examine its stand on Angola; Washington so far has not recognized the regime of Marxist President Agostinho Neto.* U.S. officials, however, warn that it is too early to talk about any reassessment of Washington-Havana relations. Commented a top State Department official: "The Cubans did pretty rough things. You can't give them credit for having stopped doing half of what they shouldn't have done to begin with."