IRAN: Hard Choices in Tehran

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As the demonstrations subsided, the struggle between the regime and its opponents became increasingly one of rumor and propaganda. At one point, word spread through Iran's Shi'ite Muslim community that Ayatullah (Sign of God) Qumi of Mashhad had dreamed that he had been visited by Imam Reza, a saint of ancient times. In the dream, Reza complained that Shi'ite Leader Ayatullah Khomeini had been turning Muslim against Muslim and that his teachings were thus running counter to Islamic law. Among the faithful, many were stunned; others dismissed the report as a government trick.

The Shah continued his unsuccessful efforts to put together a civilian government. He needs to find a strong Premier absolute monarch, and must take urgent steps if he wants to ensure the survival of the Pahlavi dynasty. In Ball's view, the best the Shah could hope for would be a constitutional monarchy containing moderate members of the opposition. An alternative would be to establish a regency under his son, Crown Prince Reza, who is now in advanced fighter-pilot training in Texas. Ideally, this regency would be supported by moderate opposition leaders, middle-ranking army officers and key religious leaders.

Ball's conclusions differed from the views of the man who invited him to Washington to review U.S. policy on Iran: Carter's National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski. Until now at least, Brzezinski has held that the U.S. should back the Shah staunchly, in part because of the unsettling effects any wavering about the Shah might have on such other monarchies as Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Officials insisted that as of last week, however, there was no disagreement within the Administration on fundamental points. Certainly the Ball report's conclusions are shared by most Middle East experts at the State Department. As one Middle East specialist describes it, the view is that "the longer the chaos continues, the more difficult the solution, and the longer the Shah waits, the fewer the options he will retain."

One major problem is the army. Since the Shah derives his strength from the army, it may prove difficult to convince him of the wisdom of relinquishing control of it. Similarly, the army's loyalty could be stretched to the breaking point if the Shah should appear to be doing anything to weaken his own authority and thus that of his armed forces. A confidant of the Shah's said late last week that there were only two possibilities left: either there would be a civilian government with strong support or there would be a military coup from either the left or right. The fact that someone close to the throne would even mention such a possibility underscores just how serious the Shah's situation has become. There was one other small straw blowing in the ill wind: a Massachusetts book publisher last week received an order from a Tehran bookstore for one of its titles: Leadership and Change.