Hope for the Hostages

But their uncertain status created a time bomb for the President

A ir Force One had just landed at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport Saturday night, and the presidential party was en route to a nearby hotel when walkie-talkies in the motorcade crackled to life and the drama began. There was to be a meeting later that night in Deacon's" room. Deacon is the Secret Service code name for President Jimmy Carter.

After appearing very briefly at an Italian-American dinner, the President went swiftly to his suite to huddle with aides who had been traveling with him, and also with is chief political adviser, Hamilton Jordan, just arrived from Washingon. Jordan had flown in especially to help Carter prepare for an event expected to take place within hours in Tehran. The Majlis, or Iranian parliament, was about to vote on the fate of the American hostages, who have been in captivity for a full year.

As Jordan's presence underscored, the late-night meeting involved both politics and policy. How could Carter appear as statesmanlike as possible in his response to the Majlis vole and thus blunt the inevitable criticism that his Administration was manipulating the hostage crisis to increase the President's chances of re-election:? How could he at the same time be presidential, political and humane? It was an exquisite dilemma. As one Carter aide was to put it the next day, "They've sure put us in a box."

Both the Majlis action and Carter's initial response came a few hours later The assembly approved the four demands set forth by Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini as conditions for the release of the hostages a U.S. pledge not to interfere, "either directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in the affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran"; return of the fortune of "the cursed Shah"; unfreezing of Iranian assets in U.S. banks; and cancellation of U.S. legal and financial claims against Iran.

The Majlis resolution began with an invocation: "In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful," and it ended with a strong warning: if the U.S. dragged its feet in meeting the demands, the Administration would have only itself to blame if Iran should "punish the criminals," i.e., the hostages.

In addition to the fulrmnations, there was, as always with good news from Tehran, a big hitch: the Majlis decreed that the hostages would not all be freed together — or necessarily right away. Instead they would be released in groups as each of the demands was met. The Administration had earlier agreed in principle to all the conditions, but there remained some enormous and highly complex technical problems. One example: cutting the legal tangles tying up the Iranian funds, a process that was sure to be time consuming and controversial (see ECONOMY & BUSINESS).