Diplomacy: Salvaging the Remains

Washington and Moscow preserve arms talks despite the airliner tragedy

They stop in clusters of two and three, their eyes widening in astonishment as they stare at the 5-ft.-long model of the Boeing 747 with its hundreds of miniature seats. Details about the disaster have seeped slowly into the Soviet Union, and the pedestrians passing in front of the Japan Air Lines office in downtown Moscow pause to ponder the tragedy of Korean Air Lines Flight 007. "Oh, is that the plane?" asks a wide-eyed schoolgirl. "It's so big." Murmurs her friend: "All those people." The exact death toll of 269 has not been made public to the Soviet people. "More than 200, I heard," offers a young man wearing an imitation-leather jacket. But even as he shakes his head, he echoes the brazen attitude that has been the official response of his country: "Such a plane should not have broken through our borders."

Try as they may, leaders in Washington and other Western capitals last week could not extract much more from Moscow than the qualified expressions of regret that were heard on the streets. Instead, Soviet leaders responded with volley after volley of recriminations, continuing the defiant war of words with Washington that threatens to deepen the damage caused by the air tragedy.

The week began with a theatrical standoff. The State Department brusquely summoned Oleg Sokolov, the deputy chief of mission at the Soviet embassy. Standing face to face with Sokolov, John Kelly, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, read a terse letter that "demanded ... prompt, adequate and effective compensation" for the death of the 61 Americans aboard Flight 007. When Kelly attempted to hand Sokolov the note, the Soviet diplomat refused to accept it. Kelly then declared that the U.S. refused to accept Sokolov's refusal. The routine was repeated at week's end when Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt called Sokolov back to the State Department and tried to give him a note protesting the Soviet refusal to accept the compensation demand. That too was refused. The somber Alphonse-and-Gaston routine left the U.S. looking for a way to deliver the compensation demand, which is not formally in effect until accepted by the Soviets.

The U.S. was more successful at making its point in the United Nations, but lining up the nine votes necessary to pass a resolution "deeply deploring" the U.S.S.R. in the 15-nation Security Council was surprisingly difficult. China, considered a sure yes vote, decided that its antipathy toward South Korea outweighed its desire to humiliate the Soviet Union. It announced that it would abstain. Other Third World nations, including Zimbabwe and Guyana, argued that disputes over the facts of the incident made it impossible to single out the Soviets for blame. Applying strong pressure, U.S. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick was able to win the reluctant support of Jordan and Malta, thus corralling enough votes to force the Soviet Union to use its veto.