Bidding for a Bigger Role: Syria seeks to become the prime Arab power

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officials argue that by stationing Marines in Lebanon, the U.S. played into Syrian hands, since Washington, in effect, put itself at the mercy of forces largely controlled by Assad. If the U.S. could leave the Lebanese quicksand tomorrow without losing face, and without the risk of causing further chaos by doing so, some Administration officials undoubtedly would grab the opportunity.

Despite the escalation of tensions, Damascus has told Washington privately that it does not want to go to war over Lebanon. If a conflict were to break out, however, Syria could only gain: no matter how badly its forces fared against the U.S., standing up to the American giant would strengthen Syria's credentials to be Arab standardbearer. Though the terms of the 1980 Soviet pact with Damascus have never been revealed, officials in Moscow have hinted that Soviet troops would enter the fray only if Syrian territory were invaded. According to British intelligence officials, Moscow would unleash the Soviet-manned SA-5s to counter a full-scale Israeli move against Syrianheld Lebanon, but it would hold its fire in the face of a U.S. offensive, leaving it to the Syrians to retaliate. Administration officials believe that the Syrian attacks on U.S. reconnaissance planes were not an invitation to war but a probinig of how much the U.S. would take. Observes Joyce Starr, a Middle East expert at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies: "The Syrians are playing decibel politics. They heighten tensions for a few days, then lower them." Some Washington officials believe that Syria, after it stops testing U.S. resolve, will settle down and work out a deal with Gemayel six months to a year from now. In this view, once Gemayel shows progress—no matter how scant—in mending his country, the U.S. Marines will come home.

Others contend that such an analysis is far too rosy. "Syria will never leave Lebanon unless it is forced to evacuate," says an Israeli general. Even if Syria is guaranteed influence in Lebanese affairs, according to British diplomats, Damascus will still insist on the return of the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights as the price for its withdrawal from Lebanon. Sooner or later, in the view of many Middle East experts in the U.S. and Western Europe, Syria must be brought into negotiations for a Palestinian homeland. As one senior British diplomat puts it: "Like it or not, Syria is the key to a Middle East settlement."

Both Washington and Jerusalem seem reluctant to recognize that reality. Even if they did, Assad would probably prefer not to negotiate now. The Syrian President believes that the Arabs should deal with Jerusalem only when they are as strong militarily as the Israelis, if not stronger. The Reagan Administration, moreover, has shown no interest in the kind of comprehensive talks, complete with Soviet representation, that Syria has demanded. Leaving aside the question of whether Moscow would be helpful or not, the White House is unwilling to grant the Kremlin any more influence in the region.

In the meantime, the U.S.-Syrian relationship is likely to contain more jolts as American reconnaissance planes continue flying over Syrian antiaircraft batteries. America's long-term difficulties in dealing with Syria stem partly from the fact that, as one top U.S. diplomat put it, "our carrots and sticks