Bidding for a Bigger Role: Syria seeks to become the prime Arab power

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one people," says a Syrian farmer living near the Lebanese border. "We go back and forth as if it were one nation." The ports of Beirut and Tripoli are Damascus' main links with the sea, while Syria serves as Lebanon's land route to Arab markets. For 28 years, until 1948, the two countries used the same currency, the Lebanese-Syrian pound. Tradition dictates that a new Lebanese President's first foreign trip is to Damascus (Amin Gemayel's maiden visit, scheduled for Nov. 13, was postponed because of Assad's illness). Says a Syrian official: "Lebanon is the one issue on which any Syrian President would be prepared to take the greatest risk."

Indeed, Assad risked violent opposition at home and a cut in Arab aid when he invaded Lebanon in 1976. Syria's ostensible allies, the P.L.O. and a coalition of leftist Muslim forces, were about to crush the right-wing Christian militias when the Syrian army came to the rescue. Nearly five months later an Arab summit legitimized the Syrian presence under the rubric "Arab Deterrent Force," and Assad's soldiers have stayed ever since. Meantime, the Syrians have fought the Christians, whom they once saved from defeat, on several occasions. At some point or another, every Lebanese faction has sought Syria's help. Syria's prominent role in Lebanese politics is as much a result of Lebanon's invitations as of interference by Damascus. Currently the

Druze, the Sunni leadership of Tripoli and anti-Phalangist Christians are allied with Syria through the National Salvation Front, and Lebanon's mainstream Shi'ite organization, Amal, has its own ties to Damascus. Together these groups control all of Lebanon except Beirut, the Phalangist enclave north of the capital and certain patches of southern Lebanon where Israeli-sponsored militias operate.

By refusing to pull out its forces, Syria in effect scrapped the Israeli-Leba-nese accord of last May. That document, forged with the help of Secretary of State George Shultz, called for Israel to withdraw the 30,000 soldiers who remained in Lebanon after the previous summer's invasion. Though Assad was angered by being left out of the |. negotiations, he was even more f^ livid that the treaty gave Jerusa-5 lem diplomatic and trade privileges with Lebanon. That collided u with Assad's notion that Syria '? must not only retain influence in f Lebanon, but ensure that Israel has none. Assad was virtually 1 handed a veto over the treaty H when Israel and the U.S. quickly 4 signed a side letter saying the agreement would not be enforced unless Syria pulled its troops out as well. Says a senior West European diplomat in Damascus: "Inept diplomacy by the U.S. and Israel made it easy for Assad to block what he least wanted, Lebanese concessions to Israel."

Israel decided in September to pull its forces back a few miles to more defensible positions along the Awali River, a move that emboldened Syria. The strategic retreat, which took place before the Lebanese Army could fill the vacuum, allowed Syrian-backed Druze and Palestinian forces to drive the Christian Phalangist militiamen out of the strategic Chouf Mountains. The fierce fighting produced a cease-fire agreement that favored the interests of Syria and its Lebanese proxies. The primary gain: Gemayel was forced to convene a