Bidding for a Bigger Role: Syria seeks to become the prime Arab power

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terrorists who launched suicidal attacks against the American and French headquarters in Beirut and Israeli army ofr fices in Tyre two months ago. Based hi Baalbek, which is in Syrian-controlled eastern Lebanon, the Iranians acted under the auspices of Islamic Amal, a radical Shi'ite Muslim militia that broke away from the larger and more moderate Amal organization in early 1982. But they could not have undertaken the murderous task if Syria had disapproved. Says a Western diplomat: "The Syrians did not control and organize the operations, but certain elements in the Syrian regime knew what was going to happen and decided not to act."

Syria's hand is more visible in the continuing campaign to destroy Arafat. Though Assad and the P.L.O. chieftain have worked together in the past, the strains were always there. As early as 1969, when Assad was Defense Minister, he tried to regulate the activities of P.L.O. guerrillas in Syria. As President, he supported Arafat's avowed enemy Abu Nidal, a rogue P.L.O. leader who ran the Black June terrorist group. After the Lebanese civil war, Assad supported Beirut's right to impose rules on the P.L.O. even though the group was far stronger than the government. While Assad saw the Palestinian cause as subordinate to his wider vision of Arab unity, Arafat believed the P.L.O. must remain Independent of any Arab nation. Differences hi the personal styles of the two men also played a part in their estrangement. A lifelong military man, Assad is used to giving orders, expecting them to be obeyed and staying out of public sight, while Arafat, a thoroughly political animal, likes haggling, cutting deals and basking in the spotlight of publicity.

Assad had long been looking for ways to clip Arafat, and the opportunity arrived last May: the P.L.O. chief unwisely elevated several unpopular commanders within Fatah, the paramilitary group that he established and that still accounts for about 80% of the P.L.O.'s military strength. Palestinian fighters, outraged by Arafat's appointments and by his growing preference for negotiation over combat, rose up in revolt. Encouraged by Syria, and in some cases backed by Syrian troops and artillery, the rebels gained strength through the summer and eventually forced the loyalists out of Lebanon's Bekaa Valley and into Tripoli. When Arafat joined his forces there in September, the time was ripe for Assad to finish him off.

Instead, Syria blinked. As Arafat's forces retreated to Tripoli after putting up a fierce fight against superior numbers in the city's suburban refugee camps, it became clear that the wily chairman could hold out longer than expected. The Saudis and the Soviets, reluctant to see Arafat destroyed, began putting considerable pressure on Syria to accept a ceasefire. The pleas at first were ignored, but then Assad was hospitalized. Though it is impossible to say what role the President's illness played, Syria approved the halt in fighting. "His sickness prevented Assad from engaging in the extensive diplomacy necessary to resist the demands for a cease-fire," speculates a Western ambassador in Damascus. "Perhaps the decision was made to take the easy way out."

The siege seriously weakened the P.L.O. and should permit Assad even more control over its affairs. The conflict, however, will switch from open warfare to