Bidding for a Bigger Role: Syria seeks to become the prime Arab power

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internal wrangling if Arafat escapes from Tripoli and convenes a meeting of the P.L.O. leadership. In that arena, the deftly persuasive Arafat usually triumphs. Though the rebel demands for "collective leadership" may limit his authority, Arafat may not lose as much power as Assad would desire. True, the revolt does make it nearly impossible for Arafat to win support for reopening talks with Jordan's Hussein on the Reagan peace plan, but the P.L.O. leader was unable to get such backing before the rebellion anyway.

rafat's troubles are a good illustration of the complicated relationship i between the Syrians and the Soviets. By midsummer, Moscow had let both Assad and Arafat know that it was highly displeased with the rift. Aside from having nothing to gain from a fight between its two most valuable allies in the region, Moscow valued Arafat as an alternative to Assad for entry to the Arab world. Nonetheless, Syria pressed the fight until deciding on its own, for whatever reason, to hold back. Says a Damascus university professor: "The Soviets know that the Syrian decisions on Middle Eastern affairs, especially where Lebanon and the P.L.O. are concerned, will always be independent."

Created out of mutual need, the Soviet-Syrian marriage was consecrated in 1980, when Assad's growing sense of isolation in the Arab world and his burgeoning ambitions led him reluctantly to sign a treaty with the Soviet Union, which always has been eager to make friends hi the Middle East. But for the next two years Assad failed to appoint an ambassador to Moscow. The devastating loss of an estimated $1 billion worth of military equipment by the Syrians during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon further dismayed the Soviets. After the war, however, Moscow upgraded the arsenal by some $2 billion. The Soviets supplied about 160 fighter aircraft, including advanced MiG-23s, to replace the 96 planes downed hi dogfights over the Bekaa Valley. Some 800 T-72 tanks have been added to Syrian divisions, well above the number of older and smaller T-54s and T-55s lost in Lebanon. The Soviets have also shipped about 200 armored personnel carriers and between 600 and 800 trucks, considerably enhancing the mobility of Syrian troops.

Moscow added a new element of instability to the region by installing the SA-5 missiles. With its range of 186 miles and electronic homing devices, the SA-5 is regarded as the most sophisticated surface-to-air missile hi the Soviet inventory. Some 5,000 Soviet soldiers and technicians man the missile batteries and communications centers, while 3,000 Soviet advisers help train the Syrian army. Western military officials estimate that six to nine new SS-21 surface-to-surface missiles have been delivered and are being used for training. Though the Syrians already possess SCUD-B missiles, with nearly double the range of the SS-21s (167 miles vs. 75 miles), the new missiles are more accurate. In addition, the Syrians are boosting the number of missile launchers from 36 to 54. The recent deliveries are in line with Syria's policy of constantly improving its military capabilities, but they have led Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas to indulge hi saber rattling. "The Negev is within the range of our missiles," he boasted in an interview with a Lebanese magazine. The Negev desert, about 200 miles from Damascus, is home to the Israeli