Force and Personality

Shultz and Weinberger present different views of military power

Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger have been working together for most of the past 15 years: as high economic officials of the Nixon Administration; then as top executives of Bechtel, the worldwide construction firm; and currently as the most powerful members of Ronald Reagan's Cabinet. They breakfast together once a week, alternating as hosts, and confer frequently by telephone. When Shultz was asked last week about their reported disputes, he replied, "That's nonsense."

That is for the record. Privately, U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick has told friends worriedly that the tension between Shultz, her nominal superior, and Weinberger has become "palpable." A Pentagon insider is blunter. Their dislike, says he, "is only thinly disguised when they meet publicly."

What is more, the feud is not simply a personal one. For months, Shultz and Weinberger have been giving Reagan conflicting advice on some of the gravest issues of U.S. policy. Lately they have been carrying on what amounts to a public debate.

Weinberger opened a new round with a speech three weeks ago, taking issue with earlier statements by Shultz. The Secretary of Defense laid down six conditions for the use of U.S. combat troops abroad. Some were unexceptionable: "We should have clearly defined political and military objectives." But others were more controversial. Military power, said Weinberger, should be used only "as a last resort" to protect "vital interests" of the U.S. or its allies, only "with the clear intention of winning" and only if there is "some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress."

On a broad range of issues—arms control, trade with the Communist world, dealings with NATO allies, to name a few—Weinberger is far more hawkish than Shultz. But on the use of U.S. armed forces, the Pentagon boss reflects the views of military commanders who still shudder at the memory of Viet Nam. While the Pentagon clearly would like to see the Sandinista regime topple in Nicaragua, Weinberger has ruled out direct U.S. military involvement. Said he: "The President will not allow our military forces to creep—or be drawn gradually—into a combat role in Central America." Shultz, while no less opposed to military entanglements in that region, has long insisted that his diplomats must be backed up by a credible willingness to use force. He replied to Weinberger in a speech of his own last week, arguing that "there is no such thing as guaranteed public support in advance." If force is used effectively, as in Grenada, he said, public support will follow; if not, as in Viet Nam, it will be "frittered away." He added, "A great power cannot free it self so easily from the burden of choice."