THE NATION 1962: Foreign Relations: The Backdown Cuba Missile Crisis

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Against the surge of feeling, Khrushchev reacted hesitantly. Twelve hours after Kennedy's speech, the Kremlin issued a cautiously worded statement. Then Khrushchev grasped eagerly at a suggestion by U Thant, Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, for a two or three weeks "suspension," with Russia halting missile shipments to Cuba and Kennedy lifting the blockade. Kennedy politely declined.

But Khrushchev had one more trick up his sleeve. He offered to take his missile bases out of Cuba if the U.S. would dismantle its missile bases in Turkey. With a speed that must have bewildered Khrushchev, the President refused.

That did it. Early Sunday morning came the word from Moscow Radio that Khrushchev had sent a new message to Kennedy. In it, Khrushchev complained about a U-2 flight over Russia on Oct. 28, groused about the continuing "violation" of Cuban airspace. But, he said, he had noted Kennedy's assurances that no invasion of Cuba would take place if all offensive weapons were removed. Hence, wrote Khrushchev, the Soviet Government had "issued a new order for the dismantling of the weapons, which you describe as offensive, their crating and returning to the Soviet Union." Finally, he offered to let United Nations representatives verify the removal of the missiles.

If carried out, it was capitulation.

Kennedy said he welcomed Khrushchev's decision. In his stand against Khrushchev, the President had not once missed sight of the central point: that the Soviet missile capability in Cuba was a threat to U.S. survival. By directly challenging Soviet aggression in the hemisphere, Kennedy was acting on the fundamental principle of the Monroe Doctrine. And he had given momentous meaning to the principle of moving forward.