Beirut: A Fortress Under Heavy Fire

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The water and power cutoff sent Saudi Arabia's King Fahd into a rage at both Israel and the U.S. Early last week the pro-Western King fired off an angry message to Reagan, demanding that the U.S. force Israel to restore these essential services. If the U.S. could not deliver on such a small matter, Fahd wondered, how could Washington hope to move Israel on larger issues? The White House got the message and sent one of its own to Jerusalem, but the Israelis waited several more hours before turning the water back on.

The status of the secret negotiations appeared to shift almost from day to day. On Thursday the Israeli Cabinet discussed the nine-point U.S. peace plan that had previously been accepted in principle by the Palestinians and the Lebanese. According to diplomatic sources, the plan calls for: 1) Israeli troops to withdraw from the immediate Beirut area; 2) Palestinian forces to depart from Lebanon, carrying their personal weapons but leaving heavy arms behind; 3) U.S. naval units to guarantee the security of the evacuation; 4) Palestinian forces to be evacuated to the Syrian port of Latakia, and from there to the Arab states that agree to receive them; 5) a force of American, French and perhaps other troops to be deployed in Beirut temporarily; 6) Lebanese army units to enter West Beirut simultaneously; 7) a new and presumably stronger Lebanese government to be formed; 8) the P.L.O. to maintain a diplomatic mission in Lebanon; and 9) two small Palestinian military units to be attached to the Lebanese army until all foreign soldiers have been removed from Lebanon.

Israel's Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir later told a Knesset committee that his government rejected any notion of a continuing Palestinian diplomatic or military presence of any kind in Lebanon. To permit the P.L.O. such a presence, Shamir argued, would make it possible for the guerrillas to resume their activities after the evacuation. Privately, however, Begin was reported to have told colleagues, "The P.L.O. has political bureaus in Cairo, New York City and even in Washington. How could we reject a bureau in Beirut?"

The P.L.O. was insisting on a residual presence partly to save face, and partly to guarantee the safety of the 500,000 Palestinians—most of them refugees—who would remain in Lebanon. The P.L.O. was concerned that in the aftermath of its withdrawal, Christian Phalange forces might seek to exact their revenge against Palestinians who stay in Lebanon. But late in the week the P.L.O. reportedly dropped the two demands.

One of the most difficult unresolved problems was that of defining which Palestinians in Lebanon would be subject to expulsion. Many of the fighters are only part-time military men who could easily shed their uniforms and fade into the civilian population. Others are only marginally identified with the P.L.O. What would be the fate, for instance, of the nursing student, 18, who works at a P.L.O. hospital? Or the university professor who has an office at the P.L.O.'s Institute for Palestine Studies? Or the businessman who occasionally sat on P.L.O. committees and was often called upon for advice?