Soviet Union: Point and Counterpoint

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Still, for all the public displays of Western unity, there was no doubt that Andropov had come up with a skillful countermove. The audience that most interested him was not Washington, Paris or London, but the large number of Europeans, especially West Germans, who are expected to put increasing pressure on NATO governments this year to back off from their deployment decision.

Western military analysts found many faults with the Andropov proposal, as beguiling as it might seem on the surface. They pointed out that Britain's 64 submarine-launched missiles and France's 18 land-based and 80 sea-based weapons were part of independent national defense forces and could not be counted on to protect West Germany or any other NATO member. The French and British missiles are not the equivalent of the SS-20, in either accuracy or number of warheads. Nor did the Andropov plan specify whether Moscow intended to dismantle any SS-20s or simply move them out of European Russia. SS-20s could be returned from locations in the east to within striking distance of Western Europe in a matter of weeks. The range of the SS-20: 3,100 miles.

Andropov's offer was accompanied by a thinly veiled threat. Said he: "It would be a good thing if thought were given to the grave consequences that the stationing of new U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe would have for all further efforts to limit arms control." Later in the week, Leonid Zamyatin, spokesman for the Communist Party Central Committee, hinted that if NATO deployed the Pershing II and cruise missiles, the Soviets could walk out of the INF negotiations. Said he: "What would there be to talk about?"

Andropov also repeated proposals made by Brezhnev. The Soviet Union, he said, was prepared to cut the number of its intercontinental missile-delivery systems by more than 25% if the U.S. agreed to do the same. Andropov specifically warned Washington against using the MX intercontinental ballistic missile as a bargaining chip in arms negotiations, one of the arguments Reagan has used for deploying the MX. According to Andropov, the Soviet Union would counter any such challenge by building similar missiles and was already testing its own version of the long-range cruise missile.

Washington was pleased last week by the show of unity within the alliance, but U.S. officials remained worried that the Soviet Union would try to use public opinion to win what it cannot get at the bargaining table in Geneva. The Andropov proposal has a superficial logic to it. If Reagan sticks to his position, known as the "zero option," he runs the risk of confirming a suspicion held by many Americans and West Europeans: that he is not seriously interested in arms reduction. Administration moderates have urged Reagan to show more flexibility at the negotiating table, but hard-liners insist that he should make no concessions to the Soviets. The question the President must soon resolve is whether he can afford to ignore the counteroffer that Andropov has now made. —By John Kohan. Reported by Erik Amfitheatrof/Moscow