Alexander Haig

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is true that I raised that subject often. Cuban troops in Ethiopia were the praetorian guard of a regime whose policy had caused inestimable suffering. Cuban troops in Angola were the chief impediment to a settlement that might bring peace to that country and independence to neighboring Namibia. But it was the role of Cuba in the insurgency in El Salvador that engaged our attention in the most urgent manner.

There was not, however, a unity of views within the Administration over how to respond. Very nearly the first words spoken on the subject of Central America it the councils of the Reagan Administration made reference to the danger of "another Viet Nam." Indeed, this danger existed, if Reagan repeated the errors of the past and resorted to incrementalism. To start small, to show hesitation, to localize our response was to Vietnamize the situation. If it is easier to escalate step by small step, it is easier for an adversary to respond to each step with a response that is strong enough to compel yet another escalation on our part. That is the lesson of Viet Nam. If an objective is worth pursuing, then it must be pursued with enough resources to force the issue early.

The President was buffeted by the winds of opinion and tugged by the advice of those who doubted the wisdom of a decisive policy based on the strategic considerations I have outlined. One camp favored a low-key treatment of El Salvador as a local problem and sought to cure it through limited military and economic aid, along with certain covert measures. In that camp were Vice President Bush, Defense Secretary Weinberger, Director of Central Intelligence Casey (with reservations), National Security Adviser Allen and most of the others. Together with Baker and Deaver, Meese was the leading voice for caution and slow decision. Meese's keen legal mind detected the risks; his deep loyalty and affection for the President made him protective.

Some of Reagan's highest aides counseled against diluting the impact of his domestic program with a foreign undertaking that would generate tremendous noise in the press and in Congress. Weinberger genuinely feared the creation of another unmanageable tropical war into which American troops and money would be poured with no result different from Viet Nam. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, chastened by Viet Nam, in which our troops performed with admirable success but were declared to have been defeated, and by the steady decline of respect for the military—and the decline of military budgets—resisted a major commitment. I sensed, and understood, a doubt on the part of the military in the political will of the civilians at the top to follow through to the end on such a commitment.

I was virtually alone in the other camp, which favored giving military and economic aid to El Salvador while bringing the overwhelming economic strength and political influence of the U.S., together with the reality of its military power, to bear on Cuba in order to treat the problem at its source. In my view that the potential strategic gain from this combination of measures far outweighed the risks, and that the U.S. could contain any Soviet countermeasures, I was isolated.

Fortunately, the protracted nature of our discussions did not produce total paralysis. The aircraft carriers Eisenhower and Kennedy with their battle groups totaling some 30 ships were