The Soviets: One Quota That Was Overfulfilled

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Brezhnev's arms buildup gave Moscow an edge in some key areas

When John Kennedy demanded that Nikita Khrushchev remove Soviet missiles from Cuba in 1962, the American President was carrying a big stick: roughly a 10-to-1 superiority over the U.S.S.R. in nuclear weaponry. At the time, and for years afterward, it was commonly accepted in both Moscow and Washington that the overwhelming U.S. nuclear advantage had enabled Kennedy to go to the brink and force Khrushchev to back down. The episode humiliated the Soviet leadership and contributed to Khrushchev's downfall two years later. Leonid Brezhnev and his comrades were determined that the Soviet Union catch up to the U.S. in all forms of military power, but particularly in the nuclear forces that were believed to have been politically crucial in the Cuban missile crisis.*

In sponsoring the arms buildup, Brezhnev turned out to be a true Stakhanovite: he overfulfilled his quota. When he died last week, he left to Yuri Andropov a military machine that is at least as powerful as the U.S.'s in some respects, and more powerful in others. The U.S.S.R. and the U.S. now possess approximately the same number of ballistic missile warheads—more than 7,000. These warheads are the fastest, most accurate and destructive long-range weapons in the two sides' arsenals of last resort. In Soviet eyes, they symbolize the U.S.S.R.'s attainment of equality with the U.S. as a superpower.

To many Americans and other Westerners, however, the Soviet accumulation of nuclear arms represents something far more menacing. The weapons proliferated so rapidly and so massively during the 18 years of Brezhnev's reign that they conveyed the impression of a juggernaut. American deployments during the same period, while formidable in their own right, tended to occur more in fits and starts.

The Soviets have concentrated their nuclear firepower on giant land-based missiles that could, according to some worst-case scenarios, be used to launch a sneak attack and deprive the U.S. of a large portion of its ability to strike back. The smaller American nuclear weapons, by contrast, have traditionally been better suited for retaliatory, rather than preemptive, missions. Moreover, by unveiling a new generation of shorter-range missiles targeted against Europe, the Soviets have raised anxieties in NATO about the West being bullied or blackmailed in some future crisis.

The Kremlin's nuclear buildup has been accompanied by an equally disturbing increase in conventional strength and the ability to project power around the world. It has added ground forces and modernized its armored units in Eastern Europe. The Soviet navy has evolved from little more than a coastal patrol force to a bluewater, 300-vessel fleet that could threaten the industrialized democracies' sea lines of communication.

Utilizing its new global reach, the U.S.S.R. under Brezhnev also embarked on adventures far from its traditional sphere of interest. During a period when the U.S. was shrinking from overseas commitments because of Viet Nam, the Soviet Union was busy making mischief, on its own and by proxy, in Africa, Indochina and Central America, although it did avoid situations that might bring direct conflict with the U.S.