An Opening to the Middle Kingdom

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Politics aside, Reagan's trip had substantive diplomatic and economic consequences. The two nations took several practical steps to open up China to U.S. investors, including an agreement that will effectively exempt American corporations from paying U.S. income taxes on profits earned and already taxed in China. In the weeks ahead, a high-level Chinese mission will visit the U.S. to discuss trade and commerce, and Defense Minister Zhang Aiping will go to Washington to talk over military matters, including possible arms sales to the People's Republic by the U.S.

More significant, the U.S. and China reached an accord that would allow American companies to build nuclear power plants in China, an agreement that could be worth billions of dollars to the troubled U.S. nuclear industry. The deal had been three years in the making. The chief stumbling blocks were the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and the Nuclear NonProliferation Act of 1978, which require foreign buyers to get Washington's permission before recycling any U.S.-provided nuclear fuel. Reprocessed fuel can be used to make weapons. The Chinese were reluctant to make any concessions that would impinge on their sovereignty, but finally agreed not to violate U.S. legal restrictions on reprocessing. The particulars have not been worked out, however, and the deal could be torpedoed in Congress, where sensitivity to nuclear proliferation is high. Nonetheless, the agreement showed flexibility by the Chinese, who were willing to let it be known publicly that they had made the final concession.

The trip was full of such encouraging portents. No longer did Chinese leaders talk of "dark clouds" over the Sino-American relationship. Instead, their language was conciliatory. In a final phone conversation before Reagan's departure, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang told him, "I think your visit has enhanced understanding and improved relations between our two countries."

White House aides are convinced that the present regime in China is genuinely pragmatic and sincere in its desire for modernization. Even when de facto Ruler Deng Xiaoping and Zhao criticized Reagan privately for U.S. policies in the Middle East and Central America, TIME Peking Bureau Chief David Aikman reported, they seemed more concerned about means than ends. The Chinese leaders tacitly approved of Reagan's steps to check the U.S.S.R. (including his arms buildup), but warned the President that he needed to be more artful in his dealings with the Soviets, who are skillful meddlers and propagandists in the Third World.

While wary of the Soviets, who have 52 divisions on their northern border, the Chinese made it clear that they wanted a neutral role with the superpowers. (The Soviet news agency TASS was apparently unconvinced; it rapped the Chinese for condoning Reagan's "militarist course.") Reagan did his best to draw the Chinese closer, while acknowledging that he did not expect the "friendship" between the two countries to blossom into an "alliance." Chinese Communists are more to his liking than Soviet ones, Reagan said, because they are not "expansionist" and are willing to experiment with capitalism.