The Union: A Long, Mighty Struggle

(9 of 10)

The next stage of perestroika will probably be even harder than the latest. For market incentives to work, prices will have to be decontrolled -- a frightening prospect given the pent-up inflationary pressures. Rents and the prices of meat, bread and milk have been kept at the same level for decades; if decontrolled, they would be likely to rocket. Gorbachev understands the challenge. "Socialist markets cannot be formed without price reform," he told a party meeting in February. But having reached that daunting precipice, he blinked. Rents and basic food prices, he promised, will not be raised for at least two years. Until there are price reform and quality products to market, the ruble cannot become a convertible currency, which is necessary if Gorbachev is to attract more foreign investment and bring his country into international financial organizations.

To buy time for his reforms, Gorbachev has forced a significant shift of resources away from the military. He has signed a decree cutting Soviet armed forces by 500,000 men within the next two years, helping save 14% of the total military budget and living up to the promise he made in his U.N. speech last December. These cuts have been accompanied by significant changes in doctrine. Conventional forces are being reconfigured to become more defensive in deployment. In addition, the Soviets now speak of maintaining a "reasonable sufficiency" in their nuclear and conventional forces rather than attempting to match or surpass the might of the West in every category. As a Soviet arms- control official asked recently, "What do we need a huge tank park in Eastern Europe for?"

The swords-into-plowshares effort has produced some quirky situations. For example, the Ministry for Medium-Machine Building, which is responsible for building nuclear weapons, has been given the job of modernizing the dairy industry. Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov disclosed last month that the Moscow Aviation Factory will soon produce pasta.

Gorbachev also continues to advocate "new thinking" in foreign policy, which has been reflected in tangible reductions of Soviet commitments abroad. Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze is even plunging into the thicket of creating a Soviet version of the War Powers Act: he has announced that the new Supreme Soviet should have the right to debate any foreign political or military commitments.

The commanding presence that Gorbachev has been able to exert on the world stage has helped shore up his power at home. This week he is again on the road. In his visit with Cuba's Fidel Castro, who is no fan of perestroika or glasnost, the Soviet leader will have a chance to show whether his rhetoric about new thinking translates into taking concrete steps toward easing tensions in Central America. Afterward, he plans to go to London to see if Margaret Thatcher still believes, as she once said of Gorbachev, that "we can do business together."

When Gorbachev proposed his plans for perestroika, the first question was, Is he serious? He was. Then the question was, Can he succeed? That one is still open. Nowadays, as popular impatience grows, another question comes up with increasing frequency, Are his reforms permanent, or could they be reversed if he was shunted aside?