Moscow's Promising Offer

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In his Oval Office debut, Eduard Shevardnadze demonstrated that he had already mastered the institution of the White House "photo op" that precedes even the soberest diplomatic sessions. "The reporters are on the offensive," the genial Soviet Foreign Minister told Ronald Reagan. When asked by reporters what message he would convey to his host, Shevardnadze quipped, "If I tell everything to you, what am I going to say to the President next?"

Banter between the superpowers can mask a deadlock, a breakthrough or something in between. By the time he got to the White House last Friday, Shevardnadze had been through a well-publicized week of public polemics at the United Nations and quiet conversation with Secretary of State George Shultz. But the new messenger from Moscow had given no clues about whether he was carrying the fresh arms-control proposal that other Soviet officials had been hinting at for two months. The silence surprised his hosts. Was the Kremlin continuing its long propaganda prelude to the November summit between Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev? Had Moscow changed its mind about a significant new proposal?

Not at all. The Soviets did intend to make this summit prep session "serious," to use one of their favorite diplomatic adjectives, the beginning of substantive business. When the press cleared out, Shevardnadze gave Reagan a lengthy document written in Cyrillic characters: a personal letter from Gorbachev describing his general world views. Shevardnadze also outlined to the President some of the ingredients of a new arms-control plan. It could prove to be the most promising scheme ever put forward by the Soviets. Indeed, if the details still to come support the advance billing--and if the Reagan Administration decides to engage itself--the proposal could produce the most constructive negotiations since 1979, when the SALT II treaty was concluded.

Stepping back from what had become a presummit public relations duel, both sides avoided public discussion of the proposal, which will officially be placed on the negotiating table in Geneva this week. Government analysts spent the weekend parsing the Gorbachev letter and Shevardnadze's verbal presentation. But it seemed likely that the scheme will envision a large swap: the Soviets would move toward the U.S. position on reducing offensive nuclear weapons if the Americans severely limited their program of ultramodern Star Wars missile defenses.

It will not be clear for days or perhaps weeks how the U.S. will react. Until now the Geneva negotiations have been paralyzed. During the arid summer round, one U.S. representative told his Soviet counterpart, "Go ahead, tempt us. Make us an offer we can't refuse." Now Moscow appears to be trying to do just that. Further, the Soviets' move on the diplomatic chessboard will strengthen their argument that the summit can and should produce results. Reagan, on bidding Shevardnadze farewell, acknowledged that the visit had produced "progress" but declined to characterize it. Shultz, while saying that Reagan had not changed his view on Star Wars, spoke in positive terms about the latest proposition. "The President welcomed what was put before him," said Shultz. "It is something that comes forward. It is different from what they have been saying."