A Mix of Hope and Hokum

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The Soviets also implicitly offered concessions involving the power of rockets used to launch warheads. In the argot of nuclear weapons, this power is known as throw weight, the ability to hurl a payload. The Soviets now have about 5.7 million kilograms of ballistic-missile throw weight, while the U.S. has a mere 2 million kilograms. The Soviet proposal offered last week would reduce the Kremlin's throw weight to no more than 3 million kilograms, according to an analysis for TIME by Ted Warner, an arms-control expert at the Rand Corp.

Arms-control hard-liners have long insisted that Moscow's reluctance to lower throw weight has been one of the most serious impediments to arms control. Reductions of throw weight would lessen the risk of a dreaded phenomenon known as breakout, the capacity of one side suddenly to increase its offensive force and intimidate the enemy. The issue will become an important factor as the U.S. gradually moves away from a land-based ICBM force made up of multiple-warhead missiles in underground fixed silos (like the Minuteman) and relies more on mobile single-warhead missiles (the proposed Midgetman). Such weapons would be vulnerable to a barrage of enemy warheads, and very high levels of throw weight translate into an increased ability to conduct barrage attacks.

The Soviets did not budge, however, on their opposition to Star Wars. In fact, the formal Soviet proposal appeared to retreat from Gorbachev's suggestion to TIME last month that the Kremlin might at least agree to permit "fundamental" research on space-based defense systems. The Soviet proposal stipulates a prohibition on "development (including scientific research) of space strike weapons." In Geneva, Karpov did leave a little maneuvering room by stating, with studied ambiguity, that "we're not against basic research--we never were. We are against research that leads to the creation of space strike weapons." If the Soviets insist on a narrow definition of research, an arms deal could be aborted. Speaking to reporters last week in Cincinnati, Reagan refused to "retreat from research" on SDI. Asked if he would stand firm on testing components for Star Wars, he replied, "That goes along with research."

The President was just as adamant with his advisers in private. A National Security Council meeting called to consider the Soviet proposal last week turned into "a pep rally for SDI," according to one participant. While the White House did not absolutely rule out the idea of negotiating over Star Wars, the meeting discouraged in-house arms-control advocates hoping to trade off U.S. advances in missile defense for Soviet reductions in offensive weapons.

The other major pitfall in the Soviet plan, from the U.S. perspective, is the method of counting offensive weapons. The Soviets propose a 50% reduction in all "relevant" systems, those that can reach the other superpower's territory. But they count the "relevant" systems very differently from the U.S.--and in a way that is blatantly unfair.